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WALTON H. IL\1\IILTONo 
A doctrine is like a family that is coming up in the 'ZCOrld; it fits 
itself out with an ancient lineage. 
OLD SIMIAN PROVERB. 
I 
THE te},.i;, v;•hich once lent authority to an essay in the law, has 
gone the way of studied sermon and formal faith. But its pass-
ing brings no deprivation of the ancient liberties. For in its 
stead the scribbler in need may select a decision from the emerg-
ing volumes of the reports, suit it to the occasion, and endow 
it with the appropriate meaning. Now and then a provident 
court hands down a judgment which properly combines sugges-
tion and provocation. A recent example of such judicial benevol-
ence is "the good oil case" 1 which seems heaven sent as the point 
of departure for the theme of the buyer, his ware, and the law. 
The legislature of Connecticut, in an effort to protect the 
purses of its improvident citizens, passed an act fLxing mini-
mum standards for motor oils offered for sale. The statute 
provided that vendible oils must meet the tests for quality and 
composition set dowTTI in Teclmical Paper 323 B, issued by the 
United States .Bureau of 1\Iines. The legislation was challenged 
by a number of oil companies who prayed the federal court of 
the district of Connecticut for equitable relief. After an ex-
tended hearing, a special bench of tlu·ee judges found the stand-
ards to be unreasonable, declared the measure to be a taking of 
property without due process of law, and pronounced the stat-
ute null and void. 
The decision of the court provokes doubt rather than dissent. 
As the fortunes of law broke, the dominant issue came to be 
the reasonableness of the prescribed tests. In an able and com-
prehensive brief, the attorneys for the companies recited chapter 
"'Southmayd Professor of Law in the Yale University School of La'\'.•, and 
author of Affectation with Public Intacst (1930) 39 YALE 1089. 
1 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Trumbull, 43 Fed. (2d) 154 (D. Conn. 1930). 
[1133] 
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and verse from experts, and presented the results of technical 
experiments to show how fallible were the Bureau of Mines 
standards as an index to the practical worth of oils. The repre-
sentatives of the state countered as best they could with an argu-
ment whose burden was largely "powers," "the nature of regula-
tion," and "legislative discretion." If the testimony introduced 
by the companies had been subjected to critical examination by 
the state, or if an argument for the technical reasonableness of 
the disputed tests had been introduced, the result might have 
been different. As it was the dialectic of legalism was of no 
avail against the recitation of technical fact. 
But, if the question of regulation of the quality of the ware 
was not formally faced, it was by no means ignored. The ob-
ject of legislation was neither bread, of olden time the staff of 
life, of late a declining article in the dietm·y; nor drinl<, once 
a lawful necessity, now a legal superfluity. Instead the issue 
was argued in terms of a product which as our culture goes 
is an essential commodity of everyday use. The court seemed 
concerned lest opportunity for sale be denied to "useful oils 
which have a wide market and satisfy the public," 2 and seemed 
disposed to frown upon attempts to prevent "buyers and sellers 
from dealing" when "the buyer gets exactly what he wants." 3 
The appearance of such reasons, held in ready reserve, is signifi-
cant; it indicates that even in high judicial places the notion 
survives that the buyer had best be allowed to take his own 
chances.4 
This judicial incident, apparently closed,o throws into striking 
relief the contrast between legal rule and market fact. The 
large corporation sells motor oils at filling stations which dot 
the country side; it uses the resources of an intricate technology 
in their refinement; it employs instruments of precision to estab-
lish the minimum standard of quality which vendibility makes 
necessary; it is able to enumerate the properties of the product 
in the exact language of chemical elements and composition. 
The consumer has only the amateur's acquaintance with oils; 
his knowledge of properties and processes is crowded within 
compact trade-names like Mobiloil, Texaco, and So cony; his 
caution lies within his bit of untested experience which he may 
mistake for experimentation. The goodness of the product de-
2 Ibid. 158. The opinion was written by Judge Thomas of the district 
court. Circuit Judge Augustus N. Hand and District Judge Burrows also 
sat. 
a Ibid. 158. 
4 Note (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 116, 117, n. 3. This comment presents a 
thorough discussion of the many issues raised in the case. 
s In spite of the importance of the constitutional issue, there is no record 
of an appeal by the State of Connecticut to the United States Supreme 
Court. 
HeinOnline  -- 40 Yale L. J. 1135 1930-1931
1931] CAVEAT EMPTOR 1135 
pends upon what the traffic, aided by the test of eye and finger 
and crude remembrance, vrul bear. He has the protection of the 
competition of other corporations for his custom so far as his 
unproved standard enables him to recognize the superior product. 
He has his abstract right to a private suit, if the oil he gets 
proves not to be the oil for which he bargained.G Only if his 
personality is corporate, or he associates himself with like buy-
ers, is he able to oppose science with science, match technique 
with technique, and share in the terms of the bargain. But in 
this l'espect motor-oil is a typical good of modern commerce. In 
the purchase of soaps, drugs, canned fruits, bric-a-brac, vacuum 
cleaners, dictionaries, radios, motor cars, and many another 
article, the buyer's inability 7 to judge the quality of the ware 0 
is in striking contrast to the general legal presumption of his 
competence. 
A contrast so striking invites a study of the legal presumption 
of the buyer's ability to look out for himself. This lingers in an 
era -in which organized salesmanship has out-moded the individ-
ual seller. The refusal of public authority, tlu·ough legislature and 
judiciary, to accord effective protection to the purchaser, has 
b.een chrystallized into the compact expression caveat emptor. 
Although the words are supposed to constitute a principle of 
the law of sales, the rules which govern the vending of goods 
are far too detailed and specific to be set down so succinctly. 
They change in meaning ·with the course of events, and differ-
ent judges may read words narrowly or broadly to secure vari-
able results. 1\Ioreover cfweat emptor has been a matter of 
judicial opinion, a value if you will, a principle if you must, 
which directs even the rules of laws to its own ends.0 Its power 
6 The buyer has, of course, his abstract rights to legal remedies. He 
may, if it occurs to him and he dares, demand of tlte agent of tile company 
who waits upon him, an express warranty in detail of the qualities of the 
oil; and, if he drives away with oil in his engine, call upon t11e courts for aid 
in making it good. He may, even without a document, pro\'e an implied 
warranty, and get his money back, or part of it. He may perchance col-
lect for consequential damage on the plea of negligence or fraud. 
7 The head of a large department store once remarked to me: "God 
created the masses of mankind to be exploited. I exploit them; I do His 
will." 
s A test for state intervention has been proposed by a great eA-pcment of 
individualism, John Stuart Mill. It is, where "the customer'' is not "a 
competent judge of the commodity." PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONO~lY 
(1848), Bk. V, Ch. XI, § 8. 
9 A passage by :Mr. Chief Justice Shaw deserves quotation in tile margin: 
"It is one of the great merits and advantages of the common law, that, 
instead of a series of detailed practical rules, established by positi\'C prop;:;-
sitions, and adapted to the precise circumstances of particular cases, wltich 
would become obsolete and fail, when the practice and course of businezs 
to which they apply should cease or change, the common law consists of a 
few broad and comprehensive principles, founded on reason, natural justice, 
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of compulsion resides in the individualistic common-sense to 
which it belongs, and the expression of this common-sense has 
been limited to no legal domain. It is to be found in public law 
and in private, in a failure to keep improper goods off the market 
and in the imperfect remedies available to the buyer, in the 
inadequacy alike of preventive legislation and of remedial ac-
tion. The study, accordingly, must take into account the pre-
vailing ideas in the minds of judges as well as their holdings 
and must survey the whole realm within which the buyer is ac-
corded or denied legal protection. 
The focus of an inquiry which is beset with hazards is 11the an-
cient maxim of caveat emptor." In the pages which follow an 
attempt has been made to set down, at least in fragmentary 
form, 10 some account of a good old doctrine, 11 of the rules of 
law it has come to comprehend, and of the public policy it has 
been made to serve. 
II 
Caveat emptor is not to be found among the reputable ideas of 
the Middle Ages. As custom of trade or rule of law it is not to 
be met with upon the highways of mediaeval culture. To priest 
and lord, to yeoman and villain, and even to burgler and lawyer, 
it would have fallen strangely upon the ear. They did not talk 
that langua.ge. 
The dominant note of the period was authority. The social 
organization was a hierarchy of controls; the individual, if such 
there was, owed allegiance to priest and bishop of Holy Church, 
to lord and baron of Feudal Order, to gild and town of a rising 
Third Estate. The foundations of obedience, which underlay all 
human activity, were established by churchmen. The world was 
a great penetential wherein man was fitted for the Kingdom of 
Heaven; the human being, conceived in iniquity and born in sin, 
and enlightened public policy, modified and adapted to the circumstances 
of all the particular cases which fall within it." Norway Plains Co. v. 
Boston and MaineR. R., 1 Gray 263, 267, (Mass. 1854). 
::10 The records for the early centuries are quite uneven; for tho thir-
teenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, quite voluminous; for tho six-
teenth and seventeenth, not as ample as one would wish. For tho last 
century and a half one can do no more than single out the more important 
documents, and sample the rest. The inquirer must put a skeptical trust in 
the assumption that the missing evidence is of a kind with that which is to 
be had. Thus to generalize is to assume or to omit. But the aim of tho study 
is to inquire, not to decide. It is enough if the result is a hypothesis 
whieh invites overthrow, amendment,-or acceptance. 
11 Caveat emptor, as applied to rights in land, is beyond the frontier of 
this inquiry. There, attended by all the safeguards which hnvo been con-
trived to protect the purchaser against loss, it is a very different doctrine 
from the caveat emptor of commercial law. 
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was a depraved person; he must be kept free from the world, 
the flesh, and the devil; 12 his plans, his actions, and even his 
thoughts were to be supervised by his betters,-to the great end 
of the salvation of his immortal soul. The spirit of the age, at 
least in ideal, 13 imposed a religious purpose upon all human con-
duct. 
The value of otherworldliness found expression in the mediae-
val attitude towards wealth and trade. The teaching of the 
gospel had been simple and direct; the Clu·istian was not to be 
fashioned according to this world; he was to sell what he had 
and give to the poor; he was, above all things, to avoid the pur-
suit of filthy lucre. In the early 1\fiddle Ages trade was con-
demned; it was worldly, not heavenly; it was sinfully carried on 
for gain; 14 the merchant could not be pleasing to God.1n In 
time, as exchange began to win a place in a self-sufficient econ-
omy and good things were to be had that could not be made at 
home, 16 the church came to be more indulgent. Acquinas, the 
great authority upon Christian conduct, always ready with his 
dialectic, drove an easy distinction between a wrongful trade 
which was carried on for profit and a rightful trade which served 
public necessity.U The exact line between the two was not al-
12 The idealogy of the :Middle Ages still lingers. It finds formal ex-
pression in ceremonials for admission to Christian churches which demand 
a renunciation of covetous desire and the vain pomp and glory of tlte 
world. The hymnology is still replete with e."-pressions referring to the 
worshipper as a worm and to the world as a wilderness. 
'13 The ends of auth"oritative control are well set forth in TAYLOR, TnE 
MEDIAEVAL J:IIIND (4th ed. 1927). See especially the chapters on "The 
:Monastic Ideal." 
14 The theory that each article has its own just price gave an excellent 
dialectical basis for the condemnation of trade. It was easy to argue that 
the merchant could gain only by buying an article for less, or by selling 
it for more, than it was worth. The argument, after the manner of its 
kind, became quite vexatious to churchmen in a later age, who were dis-
posed to look more favorably upon buying and selling. It goes witltout 
saying that their ingenuity was equal to the new argumentative occa:::ion. 
1 ASHLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH ECONOMIC HISTORY AND TliEORY 
(1910) 126-132. 
1G INGRAM, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECONOl\IY (2d ed. 1907) 27. 
16 The growing belief that there was goodness, or at least no badness, 
in the nature of trade is well set forth in the quaint wo1·ds of a mediaeval 
preacher; "We cannot do without ••• such as are busied with trade ••• 
They bring from one kingdom to another what is good cheap there, and 
what is good cheap beyond the sea they bring to this town." BERTHOLD 
VON REGINSBURG, a sermon on Tricks of Trade, translated in COULTON, A 
:r.iEDIAEVEL GARNER (1910), 348-354. 
17 AQUINAS, SU!II!IL~ THEOLOGICA, ETHICUS, II, II, question LX.'\.'VJI art. 4. 
Rickaby translation, (2nd ed., 1896) v. 2 p. 96. It is of note that the great 
theologian was skilled in the use of the minor premise. When called upon 
to choose between the principles of the Church Fathers and the useful 
institutions of his own day, he accepts botll. An ingenious and engaging 
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ways clear to even the most churchly eye; the zone of priestly 
forbearance was gradually enlarged, and a pursuit which served 
so worthy an end came in time to be an end worthy in 
itself. But, to the lords spiritual and even to their temporal 
successors, trade remained an instrument of social purpose; the 
dealings of traders had to conform to standards of Christian 
conduct. 
The church manuals, even as late as the seventeenth century, 
laid down standards of mercantile conduct for Christians. Aqui-
nas, theologian or lawyer as you. will, discusses with his usual 
common sense and his usual display of neat distinctions, the deli-
cate problems which traffic in wares brings. In his didactic 
fashion he asks, "Is a sale rendered unlawful by a defect in the 
thing sold?" He answers that a defect in kind, in quantity, or 
in quality, if known to the vendor and unrevealed, is sin and 
fraud, and the sale is void. If the defect be unknown it is no 
sin. Yet the seller must make good to the buyer his loss, and 
likewise the buyer must recompense the seller if he discovers 
that he has received more than he paid for.18 He next inquires, 
"Is the seller bound to mention any flaw in the thing sold?" By 
an argument that moves straight to its appointed result, he con· 
eludes that the seller is bound to reveal secret flaws that may 
occasion loss through a decrease in the value of the article or 
danger through the ware becoming harmful in ~1se. But if tho 
flaw is manifest, he is not bound to reveal it ''by any duty of 
justice," 19 though to do so would exhibit "the more exuberant 
virtue." 20 His judgment accords with an ancient adage that "a 
buyer's eye is his merchant where the defect is obvious." 21 As 
to refinements of speech, and formalities of understanding, he 
makes no reference ;22 to him, evidently, "between a simple word 
use of the technique of distinction rarely fails the emergency. The debt 
which is his due for finding a way around early mediaeval standards, fm• 
too strongly entrenched to be attacked directly has had inadequate ac• 
knowledgment. Here, in the attitude of the church towards trade, as t•l!lc• 
where in the domain of law and order, the major promise was the. last 
thing to go. 
1s Ibid. 93-94. 
u Ibid. 94-97. His quaint reason is that "because on account of it per• 
haps the buyer would wish more to be taken off from the price than 
ought to be taken off." His typical illustration is from horse trnding. As 
is his practice, he states objections and argues them away. 
20 Ibid. 96. 
21 The adage was, of course, meant to be taken literally. The oyo is to 
judge where the eye can judge, that is where the defect is obvious. In 
time the eye became symbolic of all man's faculties, its jurisdiction wns 
enlarged, and the restraint of the last five words was conveni€'ntly removed. 
The instance is typical of the ability of ancient language to express tho 
thought of a new period. 
22 See the discussion of warranty in the civil law in Section VI of this 
article. 
HeinOnline  -- 40 Yale L. J. 1139 1930-1931
1931] CAVEAT EMPTOR 1139 
and an oath God draws no distinction."23 This statement, ac· 
cording alike with the civil law and Christian morals, was taught 
as the doctrine of the true church even to a time when it was no 
longer certain what church was true. 
The institution of ecclesiastical discipline converted precept 
into practice. In an age of faith, salvation was, like bread and 
protection, a necessity; the priesthood had power to grant or to 
withhold the sacrament of the Eucharist; the possessors of the 
keys to heaven might force men to conform to their admission 
requirements. The church could convict men of sin, prescribe 
measures of atonement, impose humiliating penances, and even 
deny to the refractory the society of the faithful. The official 
listing of avarice as one of the seven deadly sins :::• brought into 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction the whole domain of trade.:::.:; It is 
not possible to discover and set down the detailed holdings which 
emerged from an application of the general principles in the 
manuals to the actual cases. The conduct of Christians in the 
business of trafficking rarely came before the higher tribunals. 
The parties to the confessional, where personal conduct was ex-
amined, were the sinner, his conscience, his. priest, and his God. 
The reports, engraved only upon tablets of memory, went to the 
grave; 26 and there could be no appeal to a court of record from 
a confessor and judge who was powerless to commit error. 
Nevertheless casual fragments bear evidence to the range of 
ecclesiastical discipline. The sermons are hardly a satisfactory 
substitute for the unavailable records of courts of conscience; 
but they do exhibit the sinful ways of gain which priests re-
garded as within their office to suppress. Usury was a symbol of 
23 Quoted in 2 POLLOCK AND 1\IAITLAND, HISTORY OF TilE ENGLISII LAW, 
(2nd eel. 1903) 195. 
24 A contemporary account of "The Seven Deadly Sins" is to be found 
in 3 SELECT ENGLISH WORKS OF JOHN WYCLIF (edited by Thomas Arnold, 
1871) 119-167. 
2~ The jurisdiction of the church was of course limited to member3 of 
the faith. But since in pre-Reformation England the clturcl1 was estab-
lished, its membership comprehended almost the entire population. The 
Jews, who were "under the protection of the King," tlmt is royal chatt1es 
useful to His Majesty, were without its spiritual dominion. SELDEN 
SOCIETY, SELECT PLE.AS, STARRS, AND OTHER RECOIIDS FROl\l TilE ROLLS 01' 
THE EXCHEQUER OF THE JEWS (edited by J. !II. lligg, 1002). 
2G How much of secrecy, how much of publicity, there '\YUS in practice, can 
not be easily determined. 1\Iany of the penances could not be performed 
without the matter being noised about. The custom of "love-days," upon 
which personal quarrels were patched up through mediation, and of pro-
cessions of penitents through the streets, indicates that the church wns not 
indifferent to the employment of the opinion of the community as an agency 
of control. Instances are given in SELDEN SOCIETY, THE Courrr BtillON 
(edited by F. W. Maitland and W. P. Baildon, lSOl) 20, 47, 57, 7·1. In 
later times many Protestant sects have encou1·aged the public confes~'ion 
of sins. 
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covetousness at its lowest; money alone changed hands, the 
lender might take advantage of the borrower's necessities, he 
was selling "time" which belonged only to GodP The quality 
of the ware, and the fulness of its measure, held an exalted 
place in homiletic literature. A thirteenth century parson, in 
words of classic directness, denounced the prevailing tricks of 
trade.28 His catalogue begins with workers in clothing who steal 
half the cloth, use guile in mixing hair with wool, and stretch 
a good cloth to make it into ,\rorthless stuff. He notes, in pass~ 
ing, the iron-workers who hasten too soon from their work that 
the house may fall down in a year or two; the traders who take 
the names of the saints in vain for wares scarce worth five 
shillings; the sellers of meat, the innkeepers, and the cool{S, who 
keep their sodden flesh too long, bake rotten corn to bread, and 
betray folk with corrupt wine; and the boors who bring to town 
loads of 'voods that is all full of crooked billets beneath and lay 
hay on the wagon so cunningly that no man can profit thereby. 
He closes with the doctors, the shoemakers, the bakers, and the 
hucksters, and their respective temptations to quaint and profit~ 
able deceits. In like vein three centuries later Bunyan 20 and 
Baxter,30 who could not persuade themselves that exchange was 
the reason for man's sojourn on earth, were asserting the 
sovereignty of God over the rising tide of trade. 
Ideals are, of course, never 1·ealized; and the discipline of the 
church met its failures. The records of the time attest a multi~ 
tude of sins of minor greed and petty chicane to be corrected or 
at least forgiven. The church clung to its stern moral principles, 
and yet managed to accommodate its doctrine to the prevailing 
secular activities. Even before the reformation, its power to 
subordinate money-making to spiritual ends was in decline. In 
an illuminating letter, written in the early fifteenth century, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury laments that temporal punishment is 
held more in dread than clerical, and that which touches the 
body or the purse more than that which kills the soul, confesses 
27 WILSON, A DISCOURSE ON USURY (1572) (edited with An Introduction, 
by R. H. Tawney, 1925). The church's prohibition still has a rcputabh,, 
if formal place, in the law of the land. 
2s BERTHOLD voN REGENSBUitG, sermon on Triclcs of T1'ade, supl'Ct note Hl. 
The author was a Continental, not an English, parson. It is presented horf:l, 
because of its graphic language, and because a single quotation can bo 
made to do duty for many excerpts. A text from WYCLIFF, sztpra. noto 24, 
at 333, reads, "All the goodnes that is in thes gildes echo man ouith fo1• 
to do bi comyn fraternyte of Cristendom by Godde's comaundement.'' 'fhis 
is, as a major premise, quite adequate to the demands of ecclesiustical 
discipline. 
29 THE LIFE AND DEATH OF MR. BADMAN (1680). 
30 A CHRISTIAN DIRECTORY: OR A SUMl\1 OF PRACTICAL THEOLOOU:l AND 
CASES OF CoNSCIENCE, (1678). Baxter's work, in form liko many an 
august predecessor, is in the great tradition of Thomas Aquinas. 
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the failure of the confessional, and importunes his brothers, the 
barbers of London, to use the device of a pecuniary loss to re-
strain their members from their trade on Sunday.31 When with 
changing times the principal effect of the church's prohibition 
of the taking of usury was to decrease the number of persons 
who really cared for Clu·istian burial, the stern command had 
to be relaxed. But, in spite of oversight, compromise, and ad-
ministrative failure, the church never admitted that any prac-
tice of business was outside the province of Christian ethics. 
In ecclesiastical polity there was no place for the notion that 
the seller was not responsible for the goodness of his wares. 
III 
If we pass from the spiritual to the temporal realm, we discover 
usage and institution to be marked by the same paternal solici-
tude. The picture of an authoritarian conh·ol is everywhere in 
evidence; yet the lines of the agencies of supervision are far 
from clean-cut. The activities of a people passing out of feud-
alism do not lend themselves to our distinction between public 
and private. The system of justice stretches far beyond the 
king's tribunals to include local and special courts of diverse 
duties and sorts.32 '.Che law, not yet disentangled from local 
usage and private right, varying from place to place and class 
to class, is far from common. In the work of official bodies 
administrative and judicial functions are curiously blended, and 
examples of the separation of powers are hardly to be had. The 
whole system of oversight is in an irregular fllLx; changes ap-
pear before they are recognized; the new is present long befor~ 
the old has ceased to be. There is, accordingly, no right way in 
which the secular scheme of supervision can be set down, and 
a presentation in sequence of the local, the gild-municipal, and 
the national regulation of the market is perhaps as good as any. 
If it does some violence to the distinction between institutions, 
it at least keeps to the fore the question of responsibility for 
goods offered for sale. 
31 THE 1\IEMORIALS OF LONDON IN THE TIURTEIJNTII, FOURTEE!'TU A.,'ll 
FIFTEENTH CENTURIES (edited by Henry Riley, 1868) 593-1. The leth!r is 
dated 1413. 
a2 The discussion here is limited to the local courts. The thread of the 
discussion is likely to be lost if an account of the various courts,-com-
munal, municipal, seignorial,-of leet, of baron, of custom,-is interpolated 
here. The condition of the records leaves the structure of the system, 
the functions of the several bodies, and the relations of tl1e local courts 
to the King's courts and the courts Christian quite far from certainty. 
The inquiring reader is referred to SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT PLEAS IN 
l'lf.ANORIAL AND OTHER SEIGNORIAL COURTS, (edited by F. W. Maitland, 
1889}, and to the introductions in the other volumes of the publications 
of the Selden Society mentioned in notes 33-55 infra. 
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It was in the courts of custom, of manor and baron, of leet and 
tolsey, that secular justice made its most immediate contact 
with the activities of the people. At the beginning life was lived 
very close to the soil, a standard hardly up to subsistence pre-
vailed, the list of necessities which demanded protection was 
short, the wares which came to an intermittent market and fell 
under control were few. As the crafts increased in number and 
claimed · more followers, the scrutiny of the community was 
progressively extended. The intent of the folkways, which were 
just passing into law, was to insure an open market,33 a fair 
price, an honest measure, and a quality good after the fashion 
of the day. The foundations of the scheme of regulation were 
the assizes of bread and of beer.34 A host of persons have won 
such immortality as the dusty annals of justice accord by having 
it set against their names that they were in mercy because of 
poor loaves or insufficient gallons.3~ It hardly stands to reason 
that bakers excelled brewers in their immunity to temptation; 
yet amercements for breach of the assizes of bread are not nttm-
erous,36 while it is often recorded that all the ale-wives have sold 
contrary to the assize. An entry has it that a manorial lord 
claimed his liberty to collect revenue from brewers who were 
not proof against dispensing bad beer or scant measures, not 
from the· King, but by ancient right.31 Tlie cases were so numer-
ous that the complaint was reduced to the formula, 11they say 
33 The means used was the prohibition of regrating, engrossing, und 
forestalling. The legal condemnation of these practices has been so 
much discussed as to require little more than mention here. Interesting 
examples of attempts at suppression in the thirteenth and fourteenth ct>n· 
tury are to be found in SELDEN SociETY, LEET JURISDICTION IN Nonwtou 
(edited by William Hudson, 1892). 
34 The assize of bread and of beer goes back to 1256, to the reign of 
King John. SELECT PLEAS IN MANORIAL COURTS, supra note 32. 
35 LEET JURISDICTION IN NORWICH, supra note 33, at 16, 701 72; SELECT 
PLEAS IN MANORIAL COURTS, supra note 32, at 113, 139, 140. THE COURT 
BARON, supra note 26, at 50, 80, 88, 111. 
3G This is certainly true for the records of the leet court of Norwich 
and the manorial courts; the records of the court baron contain more 
references to breaches of the assize of bread than of beer. 
37 In assuming the right to enforce the assize of beer the lords WN'O 
prompted by other considerations than law enforcement. 11They made 
profit thereby, for the assize seems to have been broken with as much regU· 
larity as the most orthodox of political economists could possibly demand." 
THE MANORIAL CoURTS, supra note 32, at xxxviii. The evidence seems to 
indicate that the ale-wives were regularly rounded up, regularly fined, and 
regularly allowed to continue as of yore, a practice which in modern times 
might be described as an imposition of a franchise tax, p1·otection1 or n 
racket. It is of note that "the lords claimed their jurisdiction over bN•r 
by common custom." In other words the right-or tho privilege-of tnk· 
ing toll of the passing traffic is an ancient libe1'ty. Such a custom, oven 
if of unconscious growth, presents a most ingenious parado}:, 
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concerning .... as above." 38 The amercements were frequently 
assessed, only to be remitted. But, often enough, the baker went 
to the pillory, and the ale-wife publicly journeyed to the tum-
brel with distaff and spindle. 39 
But the system of regulation went far beyond ale and bread. 
There was a regular check-up of persons who had their own 
peculiar notions of gallons, potties, and quarts, or who on occa-
sion were disposed to buy by the greater and sell by the less.40 
A list of sample actions indicates the eAi:ent of public notice. 
It was complained that Sprouston men buy measely pigs and sell 
the sausages and puddings, unfit for human bodies in Norwich 
market; 41 that John Trukke bought a drowned cow and sold it in 
little pieces; 42 that all the cooks and pastry-makers warm up 
pastries and meat on the second and third day; 43 and that Wil-
liam Brok, butcher, sold meat of oxen and sheep, measely, bad, 
and putrid through age.44 The practices condemned, as exhibit-
ing a greater zeal for trade than concern for customers, included 
selling whelks with good and bad mixed in together,"'~ mixing 
herrings, oysters, and other goods, and selling the same to 
strangers,46 disposing of oil of one ldnd for another,47 vending 
wood mixed with verdigris and potters clay mixed with lees of 
wine,48 and possessing fuller's blocks which were used for mak-
ing up old clothes, and so making fraud in their v..ork.4:~ 
An ancient institution, of rather obscure origin, :;o was skill-
fully turned to the regulation of trade. The court leet, or view 
of the frankpledge, was held twice a year; all men of the lovter 
orders were required to present themselves in groups of ten or 
twelve, each under a tythingman, and were held responsible 
for each other's good behavior. The tourn became a ldnd of 
petty assize for the hundred, at which inquiry was regularly 
made, among many other things, into the conduct of tradesmen 
and such as bought and sold. The country was dotted with 
courts of honors, liberties, franchises, manors, and boroughs 
which together kept oversight over a very large part of the popu-
3S THE COURT BARON, supra note 26, at 16, 103. 
39 Ibid. 100; THE 111ANORIAL CoURTS, supra note 32, at x.xxvii-xxx·viii. 
40 LEE'l' JURISDICTION IN NORWICH, supra note 33, at 13, 72. 
41Ibid. 8. 
42 Ibid. 47, 10. 
43 Ibid. 13, 60, 71. 
44 Ibiil. 80. 
45 Ibid. 10. 
46 Ibid. 48. 
41 Ibiil. 47, 92. 
4Sibid. 47. 
49 Ibid. 55, 5, 60, 64, 65. 
:;o THE MANORIAL CoURTs, supra note 32, at X.'\."Vii. 
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lation.51 Before the middle of the fourteenth century form books 
were in use 52 for holding the view of frankpledge and all that 
pertained to the view. In their words the presenters were loy-
ally to inquire among themselves whether there were among 
them 53 tailors who knew how to make leggins and caps and such 
like out of an old cloak, or goldsmiths who are wont by night 
to melt down cups or bells and to make thereout buckles, brooch-
pins, and ear-rings, or smiths who were inclined to make out of 
a stolen plough-share tongs or trivets.~>4 If the catalogue is not 
an extended one, it includes the types of goods which went regu-
larly to market. 
The view of the frankpledge performed its regulatory task 
for many centuries. It was in existence before the merchant 
gild had come to power, it was performing its task after the 
craft gilds were gone. As late as the time of Elizabeth the 
mercantile presentments run; the briclrmaker makes briclts too 
small, the chandlers do not always give "good language and 
fayre spech" to customers who complain that the "stouffe ys 
not goo·d as yt ought to be," the coopers send barrels out un-
marked, the horse dealers provide "tierid jades unable to carye a 
man in his journey," a miller has "putt into a sacke of wheat a 
pottle of the sande of the sea," and porters who ought to fetch 
and carry allow cards and backgammon to divert them.00 Its 
long life and general use indicates that the institution was nicely 
adapted to the task of finding out the gross and even the subtle 
deceits of trade.56 Its function was preventive rather than reme-
dial; there seems to have been no place for a suit by a customer 
who had been worsted in a bargain. The amercements doubt-
less were pocketed by sheriff, baron, lord, or whoever dispensed 
his justice. A typical penalty was that the lord and good folk 
have damage of lOOs and shame to the amount of 40s.r.7 
If the form of action must be given a name, it may be called 
a communal tort. For it was a device contrived to protect the 
folk and the offense was against them. 
IV 
After all such institutions were local, suited to petty trade, and 
addressed to the conduct of persons of the meaner sort. The 
Gl HEARNSHAW, LEET JuRISDICTION IN ENGLAND (1908), especially pp. 
17-18. 
s2 THE CouRT BARON, supra note 26, at 3-18. 
G3 Ibid. 15, 93-106. It was written, at least in the form it here assumes, 
in 1342 or thereabouts, though the MS from which it is taken is not 
of so late a date. 
54 Ibid. 94-95. 
~~ HEARNSHAW, supra note 51, at 209-212, and the citations given there. 
~G Ibid. 115-117. 
57 THE COURT BARON, sttpra note 26, at 23-24, 26. 
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scheme of control belonged rather to the close-knit neighborhood 
than to the more regular trafficldng which came to be commerce. 
The stirrings out of which business was to emerge began in 
the fairs. There lords and bishops were less conspicuous,:;g a 
great variety of staple and novel goods were for sale, deals might 
run into large figures, and buyers and seller met as strangers 
from different places. Here there was as much of impersonality 
as the age could exhibit; and yet, even here a system of regula-
tion, designed to promote fair trading, was in evidence. Goods 
were to be sold only in shops which had frontage; r;o it was to 
the contempt of the Lord King and the great damage of the 
abbot, Go for merchants to sell wares without making display 
thereof in the body of the fair. The weights and measures were 
presumed to meet established tests,m and the alnagers whose 
office it was to measure cloth swore with mighty oaths that they 
would take nothing from one party or the other, whereby any 
harm might befall the buyer or the seller/'~ \Voolen cloths and 
canvas were not to be sold in the same place; 63 because it might 
confuse the purchaser or tempt the vendor to subtle deceit. At 
the fair of St. Ives, official supervision e:ll.1:ended to hides, wool, 
and cloth, the principal articles of traffic, 61 and to other wares 
which on occassion found their way to market.0~ An attempt 
was made to suppress deceptions of all kinds and collective bar-
gainings, 66 as savoring of monopoly, were forbidden. There was 
at hand a court to which litigants, who could not be justiced 
at common law,67 might speedily resort; "8 it heard pleas m·ising 
by reason of merchandise of all sorts, and disposed of them by 
~s The feudal lord, temporal or spiritual, was not uninterested. His 
concern grew out of proprietorship, or rights in, the fair; but lte was not 
there as the titular head of a community of :oouls. It was about the busi-
ness venture that his problems centered. The Abbot of Ramsl:!y, who by 
royal grant conducted the fair of St. Ives, discovered a threat to his 
privileges in his overlord, the Bishop of Ely. See SELDEN Socu:rY, 1 
SELECT CASES ON THE LAW l\1ERCIL-\NT (edited by Charles Gro~s, 1908) 32. 
59 l\Ierchants are hailed into court for sales at the back of houses. 1 Tuc 
LAW l\1ERCHANT, supra note 58, at 2, 56, 58. 
Go Ibid. 93-94. In tl1e case cited here, perhaps frequently, the accused is 
quit thereof. 
a1 Ibid. 23, 40, 41, 43. 
sz Ibid. 37, 41, 58. 
63 Ibid. 14, 15, 24. 
64 Ibid. :n..~ii. 
65 See the cases cited in Section VI of this article. 
66 2 THE LAW l\IERCHANT, supm note 58, at xli.'\: (1417). 
671 THE LAW l\IERCHANT, supra note 58, xlix. 
ss The courts of "pie powder" were open to "travelers." A traveler was 
defined as one who dwelt so far from the to,•m that he could not rise in the 
morning and come on foot to the common court by 9 A.M'. SELDEN Socu:rY, 
2 BOROUGH CUSTOMS (edited by Mary Bateson, 1906) 192. 
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the custom of merchants. 60 The proprietors were concerned to 
insure honesty in dealing and to keep up the good names of their 
fairs. 
As trade lost its adventitious character, the fair was succeeded 
by the market town. The burough contrived to win, buy, or 
wangle privileges from the overlord, and in industrial matters 
became almost a self-governing community. It claimed over 
manufacture and sale the control which the manor had exercised 
over agriculture; upon the ancient foundations, in the spirit of 
the authoritarian ideal, it erected a detailed and elaborate system 
of regulation. The gilds, decked out in the trappings o.f religious 
orders and dedicated to the worship of God, Our Lady the 
Virgin, and all the Saints,7° held themselves out to serve as 
roundly as any Rotary Club. The conduct of the several hancli-
crafts were regulated by their own statutes, which became 
rather generally ordinances of the town. Their enforcement 
rested with the officers of the gild, under the oversight of officials 
of the city. The Mayor and Alderman constituted an authority 
which was alike an administrative body and a court. They heard 
complaints and outlawed anti-social practices; before them were 
brought for trial by jury persons who had violated the ordi· 
nances. The right to try causes in their own courts, and not 
have to look for justice to the king's benches, was highly prized; 
the fair name of the liberty of the city was not to be slandered.11 
The system differed in its details as it was accommodated to the 
petty trade of Beverley, the more extensive merchandizing of 
maritime Bristol, or the great business of London; but in aim, 
in spirit, in institution it was everywhere much the same.72 
The market was the hub of industrial life, and an elaborate 
code was contrived for its control. In London every day save 
Go.A discussion of cases involving the quality of the ware under the 
law merchant is to be found in Section VI of this article. 
10 From the Preamble to the Ordinance of the Gild of the Tailol'S in 
Exeter {1466) 2 TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS, FROM THE ORIGINAL SOURCf:S 
oF EuROPEAN HISTORY, (University of Pennsylvania, 1805) No. 1, p. 26. 
11 A most illuminating case (1371) which touches upon the common law 
and its rivals, is recorded in MEMORIALS OF LoNDON, sllpl'a note 31, at 352·3. 
A person is hailed before the authorities because he had violated an or-
dinance that no one shall presume to publish or spread false news or to 
invent the same. The charge was that he had circulated a repol't that no 
pleas from henceforth were "to be pleaded within the City before tho Mayor 
and Alderman, but all were in future to plead at Westminster before tho 
Justiciars of our Lord the King." For the lie by him malicously invented, 
he was hustled off to the pillory, to have the whetstone hung from his neck. 
12 The materials for this and succeeding paragraphs come largely from 
London. The system of regulation stands out in clear-cut relief, tho 
documentary evidence is quite sufficient, and cities of lesser size even then 
were wont to model themselves on London town. It is significant that tho 
details presented from the records of other cities fit neatly into the genornl 
picture. 
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the Holy Sabbath was market day; in London even permanent 
shops were a part of market overt. Here goods were publicly on 
display; the buyer wanted assurance from the stranger that his 
purchase would not be snatched away by its rightful owner. A 
sale, if properly executed, carried a warranty of title -:a not to 
be had if the deal were privately cooked up.14 As industry flour-
ished exchange was affected with a public interest and had to 
be carried on in the open.n; l\Iarket places were appointed for 
meat, cheese, fish/6 and other commodities coming into the town, 
and in many trades men of the franchise and foreigners had 
their separate stands. The sale of goods in privy places and 
in secret was prohibited.'7 The craftsmen were required to keep 
away from hotels and private houses, save \\'hen some great lord 
should send for them, and required to vend their wares only in 
their own shops.'8 There were to be no sales by candle light or 
after the bell had rung for sunset; 70 old was not to be mixed 
with new whether of oil or wine ;80 the pepperers were not to 
put things of one price or sort \\rith things of another price 
or sort.81 The guests of taverners were commanded to visit the 
ra The theory probably was that if goods had been stolen the owner or 
his representative or neighbor would go to the market where they '\':ere 
likely to be offered for sale to reclaim them. In market overt the good 
could not be disposed of without publicity, and with publicity stolen prop-
erty was not likely to escape detection. In days when theft did abound in 
the land, the market overt seems to have been a kind of mercantile purga-
tory; the emerging good went forth with a clean, or nearly clean, bill of 
health. 
14 But it is interesting to note that the term "market overt" was subject 
to construction. In London shops were stalls and hence belonged to marl•et 
overt. But if a deal was consummated back of the shop, or in an inner 
room, or behind a screen, or even with the shade drown or the window 
closed, it was not in market overt. Pease, llfarkct Overt in tlw City of 
La1ulon (1915) 31 L. Q. REV. 270. The word "wousin," popularized by 
Walter Wheeler Cook, was centuries off, but there was even at this early 
time no lack of skill in its use. 
7~ I\1E11IORIALS OF LONDON, S'llpi"a note 31, at 75, 141-21 339, 40::i-7, 632-3, 
540-2 (1310-1398). This volume is a collection of documents for tlte thir-
teenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, taken from the official records. 
'Vhile other materials are included it is particularly rich in ordinances for 
the regulation of trade and in mercantile cases heard before the :Mayor and 
Aldermen. 
16 Ibid. 435-6 (1379). But I discover one item to the contrary. Fish-
mongers were commanded, not to stand, but to hawk tlu:!ir commodity, 
"moving about in the said city from street to street, and from lane to 
lane, to retail the same." The object of the ordinance was to give to 
customers equal chances at the market. Ibid. 508-9 (1388). 
11 SELDEN SOCIETY, BEVERLEY TOWN DOCUMENTS (1900) 28, 10::i (1372). 
1s Ibid. 354-5, 360-1 (1371). 
79 Ibid. 141-2, 339, 532-3 (1320-1392) ; 2 BUROUGII CUSTOliiS, suprc& note GS, 
at L'O{X. 
8o MEMORIALS OF LoNDON, supm note 31, at 45S (1382). 
81 Ibid. 120·1 (1316). 
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cellars to see that refreshing draughts came from the proper 
casks.82 The inspectors of wares and keepers of the market were 
to discharge their fiduciary offices with diligence and honesty so 
that the people of the commonalty might avoid disorderly and 
deceitful bargains.83 
The same strict system of regulation was applied to the mate-
rials and methods of manufacture. Bakers were not to be so dar-
ing as to make loaves which were false either as to the dough 
or to the weight; 84 barbers and chandlers, to put resin in im-
ages or wax-tapers; 85 weavers, to set their threads too far apart 
or turn out cloth worse in the middle than at the sides; so and 
skinners to furbish up worn furs otherwise than with the collars 
and linings of the old garments attached.sr The materials which 
went into wares were to meet rigid standards; no skinner was 
to mix lambskin with budge fur, but each kind was to.be worked 
up in itself in due and faithful fashion; 88 no tanner was to use 
false leather, disloyally tanned or curried ;80 no potter, to con-
struct utensils of bad metal, which put upon the fire and ex-
posed to great heat would come to nothing and melt; 90 no cas-
ket-maker cunningly to contrive his boxes of false and rotten 
wood covered over with linen cloth; 91 no founder to employ metal 
contrary to what it should be or a solder which might cause 
wares to fail and break and come assunder; 92 no tapicer to use 
other stuff than good wool of England and Spain, or to depart 
in his work from the lawful assize of ancient times ;03 no black-
smith to ply his trade in a secluded spot that he might avoid do-
ing work which was avowable and proper; 94 no cooper to con-
struct casks for ale and beer out of second-hand wood lest the 
savour of the liquor be spoiled; 95 and no pewterer to contrive 
any vessel except that it be made of good, lawful and sufficiant 
metell after the rewle and assay of London.90 The low standard 
of living caused second-hand goods to be much in demand; so 
it was ordained that among cobble1\s, cordwainers, and peUerers 
those who were busied with new should not intermeddle with 
s2 Ibid. 81-3, 181, 213-4, 318-19, 415 (1311-1378). 
83 Ibid. 556-7 (1403); BEVERLEY TOWN DOCUMENTS, S1tpra not~ 77, ut 7:3, 
84 MEMORIALS OF LONDON, supra note 31, at 180-1 (1331). 
85 BEVERLEY TOWN DOCUMENTS, sztpra note 77, at 57 (1467), 
sG 2 THE LITTLE RED BooK oF BRISTOL (1906) 2-6 (1346). 
87 MEMORIALS OF LoNDON, supra note 31, at 153-4 (1327), 
88 BEVERLEY TOWN DOCUMENTS, S1Lp1'a note 77, at 40-1. 
89 2 THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF BRISTOL, supm note 86, at 103. 
DO MEMORIALS OF LoNDON, supra note 31, at 118-19 (1316), 
n Ibid. 563-4 (1406). 
o2 Ibid. 512-5 (1389). 
93 Ibid. 178-9 (1321). 
94 Ibid. 361-2 (1372). 
us Ibid. 541-2 (1396). 
9G 2 THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF BRISTOL, supra note 86, at 18•i. 
HeinOnline  -- 40 Yale L. J. 1149 1930-1931
1931] CAVEAT EMPTOR 1149 
old.97 A clause tucked in here and there aimed to protect the 
repute of the town by requiring the inspection of all goods 
intended for e:x.1Jort to foreign parts. Such stray items, lifted 
almost at random from the records, attests the zeal with which 
entrance to market was guarded against unworthy goods. 
But solicitude for the consumer did not stop at a direct regula-
tion of quality; it found expression in a control almost as com-
prehensive as the range of industrial activity. 1\ferchants were 
forbidden to set up red or black cloths or shields whereby the 
eyes of the buyers were deceived in the choice of a good cloth."3 
Night work was forbidden to spurriers, founders, armorers, and 
other workers in metal, because it gave opportunity to introduce 
false iron for tin and to gild false copper.0~ 1\feasure and 
weight were of common concern; a rigid prohibition was laid 
against the ungenerous gallon, and a pound had to contain all of 
fifteen honest ounces. The feudal device of the seal was made 
to serve mercantile justice; the baker had to put his mark upon 
his bread/00 the chandler upon his tapers and images,101 the 
weaver upon his cloths/02 the bladesmith, the blacksmith, and the 
goldsmith upon their respective products.1Q3 Thus, if there were 
any defect in the work, 104 the author of the default was easily 
to be discovered. The makers of measuring vessels were forbid-
den to send them forth without seals, and were made equally re-
sponsible with their users for deficiencies.10:. As a term of the 
bargain price was no affair of the contracting parties; its amount 
was determined by authority and graduated to quality; the seller 
departed from the lavdul standard at his peril. This pecuniary 
oversight extended from bread to prayers; 100 it comprehended 
971\IEMORIALS OF LONDON, supra note 31, at 228-30, 539-40, 571-4 (13t:i5-
1409). 
981 BLAND, BROWN, AND TAWNEY, ENGLISH ECONOMIC HISTORY (19!20) 
155. 
99 MEMORIALS OF LONDON, sup;·a note 31, at 22t:i-22S, 512-15 (1!H5-1389). 
1oo Ibid. 323-4 (1365) ; 2 THE LI'ITLE RED BOOK OF BRISTUL, :mpm note 
86, at 228. 
101 MEMORIALS OF LoNDON, supra note 31, at 358-360 (1371). 
1°2 2 THE LI'ITLE RED BOOK OF BRISTOL, supra note 8G, at 2-G. 
103 BEVERLEY TOWN DOCUMENTS, s·upra note 77, at 40; l\IEr.tORL\LS OF 
LOI\'DON, supra note 31, at 338-9, 361-2, 567-70 (1372-1408). 
1°"' An interesting item records the loss of a seal with the impression of a 
tun thereon; the loser would no longer be bound by the seal aforesaid, and 
any obligation made through its instrumentality would be null and void. 
l\IE!IIORIALS OF LONDON, supm note 31, at 45 (1301). 
lO:i Ibid. 234-5 (1347). 
1os A parson was forbidden to exact more than one farthing for a mass; 
if a half-penny were e:l..1:ended in payment and the proper change was not 
forthcoming, the worshipper was to have his prayer for nothing. Tlte par-
son was, however, permitted to make less generous charges for baptism 
and marriage. Ibid. 463 (1382). 
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all the material and spiritual necessities of man. It is, however, 
of note that if a buyer discovered any of his purchase to be good 
above, or worse below, the sum paid, he ought to amend it by the 
view of honest men appointed for the purpose.107 The object of 
the law was to insure to every good offered for sale a fair price, 
full measure, and good workmanship. 
Quality was held in such regard that it served as a cloak for 
customs which served quite other ends. If strangers and men 
who were not of the franchise were not welcomed by the barbers 
as of their fraternity, it was for the love of God and a work of 
charity to keep the unskilled out; 108 if plumbers looked with dis-
favor upon alien craftsmen/09 it was for the usual reason that 
through evil persons knowing nothing of the mystery the town 
was badly served.U0 If the number of apprentices was to be kept 
down, surely there was a limit to the number of helpers a 
master could oversee without slighting his work.111 If one mas-
ter was not to entice away another master's servant, it was be-
cause the unskilled underling might profess greater knowledge 
of the art than he actually possessed.112 If serving men were 
forbidden to organize, it was to keep the control of the conditions 
of manufacture out of the hands of those less skilled in the sci-
ence:113 If no work of hurers and cappers was to be fulled in 
mills, but only by the hands of men, the prohibition of machinery 
was to insure a high-class product.114 The usages which were 
claimed as of olden time might stop little short of a monopoly; 
yet the protection of the consumer was a value so unquestioned 
that it was a first aid whenever rationalization was necessary. 
In all probability practice did not accord with the letter; but 
the regulation had its support in a scheme of law enforcement. 
Each trade had its overseers, 11u substantial and honest and credi-
101 2 BUROUGH CUSTOMS, supra note 68, at 182. This statute of Berwick 
dates from 1249. A like provision in the Grimsby Charter (1259) is that 
handclasp contracts shall hold unless the merchandise for which hands 
were clasped are of worse ,quality than was agreed, and of thi!cl a reason-
able estimate shall be made by men worthy of credit. 
108 MEMORIALS OF LONDON, supra note 31, at 393-4 (1376), 
1o9 Ibid. 321-3 (1365). 
110 2 THE LITTLE RED BooK OF BmsTOL, supra note 8G, at 93; 1 BROWN, 
BLAND, AND TAWNEY, supra note 98, at 143. 
111 MEMORIALS OF LONDON, supra note 31, at 513, 547, 564, 570 (1398· 
1409). 
112 Ibid. 322, 362, 514, 564, 570, 626 (1365-1416). 
113 Ibid. 542-4 (1396) ; 2 THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF BRISTOL, supra note 
86, at 42 (1364). 
114 MEMORIALS OF LONDON, supra note 31, at 558-9 (1404), 
uG An exception seems to have been the fullers, at least for a brief 
period of time. A petition in 1369 states that the quality of the worl• 
suffers because of the excessive demands of inspection. So the supervisot·~:: 
are relieved of their duties, and the buyer shall take the cloth at his own 
risk. Ibid. 340-41 (1369). 
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ble persons, whose office it was to inspect shops and wares.m 
The scrutineers searched truly and well, as by oath they were 
bound to do, for deceits and defects; they presented the offend-
ing craftsmen and their handiwork before the 1\rayor and Alder-
man. Against the periodic inspection gildsmen were not to be 
rebellious or contumacious. The other officers of the town had 
like duties, particularly in the markets, and private complaints 
were also entertained. In the court of the liberty, charges v,.ere 
made, the offenders put themselv.es upon the country, juries were 
summoned, the accused were asked how they were to quit them-
selves, and sentences were imposed upon the guilty. 
Almost enough causes are of record in London to make up a 
modest casebook. There is a constant procession of bakers who 
have broken the assize and are given rides on hurdles through 
the city.117 The miscreant who put a bushel of good oats at the 
mouth of the sack when the rest was of worse quality,llB and the 
wretch who sold forty-seven hides which were raw and false 
went to the pillory.U9 The circulation of such deceptive wares as 
false bowstrings, 120 barrels wanting in their true measure by two 
gallons,121 cups bound with circlets of silver gilt,122 C..'"Lps oiled 
with grease that was rank and putrid,t::a hats made out of stuff 
they should not contain, 124 worthless rings and fermails craftily 
disguised, 12;; small bags filled with other merchandize than good 
powdered ginger,126 and false counters of gold 127 was punished 
by pillory or stocks, and confiscation. A surgeon was found to 
lack the ultimate degree of skill in the treatment of disease,125 
and a faith healer, whose charm for fever and ailments was a leaf 
of parchment wrapped up in cloth of gold, was mounted on a 
horse and led through the city \'iith trumpets and pipes, with a 
whetstone about his neck, and urinals hung about him fore and 
aft.129 A number of bakers were hailed into court for contriving 
holes in their counters, artfully concealed by ingenious trap-
11s BEVERLEY TowN DocuMENTS, sup1·a note 75, at 45, 87, 101, 116, 127, 
130; IIIEMORIALS OF LONDON, supra note 31, at 358-360, 438-42, 512-15, 540-
542, 556-7 (1371-1403). 
117 Ibid. 90, 119, 423 (1311-1378): 
11S Ibid. 352-3 (1366). 
119 Ibid. 420-1 (1378). 
120 Ibid. 486 (1385). 
121 Ibid. 596-7 (1413). 
122 Ibid. 363 (1372). 
123 Ibid. 529-30 (1391). 
124 Ibid. 91 (1311). 
12s Ibid. 337-8 (1367). 
126 Ibid. 536-7 (1394). 
127 Ibid. 418-19 (1378). 
125 Ibid. 273-4. (1354). 
12s Ibid. 464-6 (1382). It should be added that the court discovered that 
he could not read and was of an atheistical turn of mind. 
0 
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doors, through which their customers' dough was stolen before 
their very eyes.130 The makers knew their wares; their custom-
ers, who were inexpert, did not. The law was invoked lest there 
be deceit of many people having no knowledge of the same.131 
It is idle to try to reduce this mass of litigation to modern 
legal terms. In spite of the monotonous words of complaints, 
the procedure was quite informal; the offenses, such as petty lal'-
ceny, conscious deceit, and plain negligence are not clearly separ-
ated. If words must be used, the cases are criminal rather than 
civil; they belong to public administration rather than to private 
action. There must have been a great deal of patching up of bad 
bargains; the casual references to brawls following a bargain, 
the studied efforts to preserve peace between buyer and seller, 
the responsibility attaching to traders' marks, and the elaborate 
provisions for tracing deceitful wares to their origin all attest 
as much; an ordinance of the pelterers that a buyer might have 
a goo!l fur for a worthless one is in point.132 But, in the absence 
of rolls of private pleas, the scope and detail of the remedial 
system cannot be set down. The reports contain many instances 
of complaints by disappointed buyers determined to have the law 
on offenders, but they are of a semi-public character. There is 
a record of an action in trespass before the Mayor's court fol' 
the sale of a garland for more than it was worth; although' it 
was successful, a public penalty was assessed ; the seller had the 
punishment of the pillory and had to forswear the city for a year 
and a day.133 
The records attest the dominance of the idea of solidarity. 
The welfare of the collect is always given first position; the stat-
utes forbade a going out to meet provisions on the way to the 
city; the good burgesses were to have equal chances to purchase 
in open market.134 The custom of sharing in bargains ac-
cording to their several estates still prevailed. 1M The devices in 
which greatest reliance was put were publicity and prevention. 
The deceitful maker and the dishonest vendor were paraded 
through the streets with their fraudulent wares, exposed in the 
stocks 136 with their false products burned beneath their feet, and 
13o Ibid. 162-5 (1327). 
131 Ibid. 399-400 (1376). 
m Ibid. 328-330 (1365). 
133 Ibid. 133-4 (1320). 
134 'l'HE LIBER ALBUS, quoted in 1 BESANT, MEDIAEVAL LONDON (1906) 1 
190-1; THE MEMORIALS OF LONDON, supra note 31, nt 255 (1350) 1 387, 
406, 432, 436, 437 (1350-1379). 
135 2 BOROUGH CUSTOMS, supra note 68, at lxviii-lxxiii. In 2 THE LtT'rLEl 
RED BooK oF BRISTOL, sztpra note 86, at 24, 73, may be found examples of 
the custom relating to fish. 
136 An ordinance provides that pillory and tumbrel be kept of due strength 
in order that judgments might be carried out without danger to limb. 2 
THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF BRISTOL, supra note 86, at 219. 
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denied the community of their trades and of the liberty; the 
maker and his ware were alike advertised to the town. The 
stream of goods which came to market was to be kept pure by 
stoppage at the source. In the prevailing legal theory it was 
not so much the buyer who was injured as the commune. The 
indictments habitually contain the word deceit and write the of-
fense down as against the repute and honor of the craft which 
is not to be scandalized, the fair name of the worshipfull 
Towne, Godys Commaundement and holy Chyrche, all Goode 
Rewell and Concience, and especially against the good people. 
The cause of action always goes to trial in the name of the Com-
monalty.137 
v 
It was out of such stuff of idea, custom, and statute that the 
national conb.·ol of trade emerged. It was, like all things Eng-
. Iish, of slow and halting growth. Its coming, against the stub-
born resistence of local usage, is early in evidence. The loser 
in a cause affecting merchandizing did not usually do so, but 
he might appeal to Westminster. A pretending officer of the 
l\farshalsea, all complete with staff capped at both ends with 
horns, makes his appearance in the fourteenth century London 
market.138 The l\fayor and Aldermen pronounce solemn judge-
ments upon offenders who have impersonated royal officials, 
marked casks of ale for the king's use, and departed in peace for 
a consideration.133 The towns were constantly apprehensive over 
the prospect of His Majesty's encroaclm1ent upon their liberties. 
The worldly concern of the Tudors and the devine· pretensions 
of the Stuarts made a reality of royal supervision. 
The emerging system was compounded out of many over-
lapping institutions. The statute of apprentices, passed early 
in the reign of Elizabeth 140 was designed to set men to their 
trades and to insure to artisans the necessities of life.m The 
Privy Council took action to keep the avarice of the sellers of 
provisions within bounds and to prevent the pinching of people 
of the poorer sort.m A Proclamation assigned the punishment 
and reform of abuses among such crafts as the 1\Iillers, Butchers, 
1372 THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF BRISTOL, sup1·a note 86, .at 121, 181; BEV-
ERLEY TOWN DoCUMENTS, supra note 75, nt 39; TUE l\1El\10RL\LS OF LO:O.&JON, 
supra note 134. 
138 THE MEMORIALS OF LONDON, supra note 31, nt 531 (1393). 
m Ibid, 489, 536, 645 (1386-1417). 
140 5 ELIZABETH c. 4 (1562). 
141 For a penetrating analysis of the legislation, nnd its incidence upon 
industrial life see FURNISS, THE POSITION OF THE LABORER IN A SYSTEr.t 
OF NATIONALISM (1920). 
142 2 CUNNINGHAM, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND CO:.ll\IERCE 
(3d ed. 1903) 92-94. 
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Vinteners, Cooks, Bakers, Fishmongers, Chandlers, Grocers, 
Mercers, Weavers, Brokers, Tanners, Smiths, Glovers, Malsters 
and Woodmongers to the Clerkes of Our Market.143 As fabrics 
came in which did not conform to the standards for broad-
cloth of the realm, their supervision was entrusted to the re-
cently created Alnager of the New Drapery.144 In like manner, 
by royal office or patent, paternal over'sight was extended to the 
trades of tin, lead, iron, silk, and coal.145 The decadent gilds 
were replaced by liveried companies, chartered by the King, and 
were charged with His Majesty's office over vendible wares.140 
These provisions, which supplemented and to some extent en-
croached upon the regulations of the towns, filled in gaps in local 
law and smoothed out the grosser differences between place and 
place. However profitable monopoly and office might be to the 
trusted, the professed end was to extinguish fraudes, to curb 
lucre and gaine, to preserve the peace between buyer and seller, 
and to avoid the discredit of the Marchandizes of the Common- · 
wealth of this Our Kingdome.147 
The Court of the Marchalsea, more notorious than well-under· 
stood, typifies a none too clean-cut control. As English usage 
goes a feudal office may be furbished up for a mercantile task.148 
The original duty of the Marshal and Steward of the King's 
Household was probably to procure the royal supplies which had 
to come up to royal specifications. To that end the office took on 
an inquisitorial character and became the nucleus of a court, 
whose authority was extended to the market from which His 
Majesty's purchases might come. A convenient fiction, neatly 
contrived by some ingenious lawyer, ·detached "The Court of the 
Verge of the Household of the Lord King at Southwark in the 
county of Surrey" from the rea~ and substantial household of the 
same Lord King in residence at Whitehall.140 A jurisdiction 
so general and inviting, once freed from commissariat duties, 
was pretentiously extended to all markets and fairs; for 11Where-
soever the King might be in England," in his active or construc-
tive presence, "there would his court and equipage be also." 100 
The Marshalsea151 had some control, how much cannot be said 
for certain, over the clerks of the market. It bobs in and out 
of the records, supplementing and disputing other authorities. 
143 Ibid. 94-5. 
144 Ibid. 296-7. 
w Ibid. 299-300. 
146 Ibid. 303-306. 
147 Quoted in Ibid. 299, note 3. 
148 SELDEN SOCIETY, 2 SELECT CASES ON THE LAW MERCHANT (edited by 
Hubert Hall, 1930) cix-cxvi. 
149 Ibid. cxi. 
I&o Ibid. cix. 
1&1 This is a corruption of Marshalcy. 
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The myal system, buttressed by charter, proclamation, and 
statute, eAi:ended to all markets. The searchers for the various 
trades performed under higher auspices an ancient duty; 1:;2 
cloths had to be measured, sealed, and stamped with the marks 
of the trader and the official m before they could be sold.m The 
clerks of the market lodged their complaints and made inquiries 
by the oaths of twelve men good and true. A typical market 
court of the late siAi:eenth century finds against various persons 
because they bake brede under the syze, do brewe ther ale not 
holesome for man's body, have no taster according to ther 
charge, sell bottles of hey not conteynyng wayghte, do sell thir 
ffysshe not well wateryd, do not sell a quart of the best ale for a 
halfpenny, and do tewe calvesskynnes.m These monotonous 
lines exhibit a jurisdiction and a spirit of justice lilce that which 
prevailed three centuries earlier. 
The aims of social policy are never realized.m Even though 
there is no report from a great fact-finding commission, the 
short-comings of regulation are not hard to discover.m The de-
sire of good and worthy men to escape the office of supervisor, 
the manifest deceits and petty tricks of trade revealed in the 
record, the realistic detail with which prayers for the correction 
of abuses are set down, all tell of practice which lags behind 
profession. In the woolen industry, ·which was regarded as the 
chief pillar of the prosperity of the nation, the alnagers neglected 
the execuson of their office, infynite abuses and deceits were per-
mytted, and seals were allowed to be affixed before the cloth was 
officially measured.1us In the seventeenth century there was gen-
eral complaint of great Abuses, Frauds, and Deceits, in fact of 
"such a multiplicity of Abuses and Offenses practised against the 
known Laws as the Cure seems almost desperate." tno The clerk 
was accused of carrying standards differing perceptibly from 
those of the Exchequer-if not to the honor, at least to the wealth 
1~2 The provisions for inspection fell little short of a national inquisition. 
For a graphic account of inspection and search at an earlier time see 
SALZMANN, ENGLISH ll:\TDUSTRIES IN THE :MIDDLE AGES (1913) 220-237. 
1~3 2 CUNNINGHA!II, supra note 142, at 296-7. 
m A contemporary complaint of the neglect of their duties by the alnngers 
is to be found in TAWNEY Al:\TD POWER, TUDOR ECONOMIC DOCUMENTS (1924) 
190-1. 
1ss Ibid. 127. The roll is from the court of the clerk of the market at 
Norwich in 1564. See also presentments in the leet court of Southhampton 
at about the same time in Section III of this a1·ticle. 
l~G The failure of tlie middle ages to attain its ideal has fittingly been 
calle:i "the spotted actuality." 1 TAYLOR, MEDIAEVAL !\fiND, s11pra note 13. 
1s• 2 CUNNINGILAM, supm note 142, at 201-5, 307-12 gives a detailed ac-
count of the failures in the regulatory system. 
us 1 TAWNEY AND POWER, supra note 154, at 190 (157G). 
1~9 The Humble Petition of William Smith, quoted in 2 Cunningham, 
supra note 142, at 204-5. 
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of the realm.160 There was evidence of an absence of the due 
and civil order which should be among moderate men in trad-
ing, 161 and merchants did not without reservation obey the pre-
cept to avoid sin rather than loss. 
But, whatever shortcomings practice might reveal, the ideal 
stood fast.162 The salvation of the soul had been replaced by the 
might of the kingdom; but business was still the instrument of 
man's necessities.163 The sense of the age, concerned to secure 
the common profit, had no reputable place for a notion of caveat 
emptm·. 
VI 
An adage was never fitted more neatly to the part than caveat 
emptor; it is, among many excellent examples, the ideal legal 
maxim. It is brief, concise, of meaning all compact. Its terms 
are too broad to be pent up within the narrow confines of rules 
of law; they are an easy focus for judicial thought, a principle 
to be invoked when the going is difficult, a guide to be followed 
amid the baffling uncertainties of litigation. The phrase seems to 
epitomise centuries of experience; it is written in the language 
of Rome, the great law-giver; it comes with the repute of the 
classics and with the prestige of authority. 
No history has traced ·the expression back to its origin; a 
lexicographer's search could tell but part of the story. Its signi-
ficance lies, not so much in the changing meaning of the words 
as in the developing market policy of which it is a graphic sym-
bol. No Roman author whose works survive seems to have scrib-
' 
16fr2 THE LAW MERCHANT, Bttpra note 148, at xlix-1. 
161 Baxter, quoted in TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE 0~' 1\IODE:UN CAl'l• 
TALISl\1 (1926) 220-221. 
162 It is a bootless task to appraise the scheme of authoritative control. 
Its merits and defects cannot be considered as against an alternative 
scheme; the institutions of an age are limited by its ideology, and tho 
prevailing ideology of the period had scant place for any scheme save that 
of a control from above. The present-day criticism for the most part is 
beside the point; it is put in terms of the failure which came ft•om not 
leaving matters of price and quality to be determined by the operation of 
the laws of supply and demand in the market. It is based upon n com-
parison of the shortcomings of regulation and the ideal results which flow 
from the perfect operation of the competitive system. The studies of com• 
petition as it actually operates indicate quite an antithesis between promise 
and performance. See, e.g., STOCKING, THE OIL INDUSTRY AND TUE COl\1• 
PETITIVE SYSTEM (1925); SOULE, THE USEFUL ART QF ECONOMICS (1029); 
and HAMILTON AND WRIGHT, THE CASE OF BITUl\llNOUS COAL (1925), In 
appraisals ideal should be contrasted with ideal, and reality with reality. 
Such a venture into judgment is beyond the limits of this study. Tho real 
question is whether the English people were better off under such a scheme 
of protection as they could devise than they would have been without it. 
1sa In concluding his account of the regulation of trade and industry in 
Southampton in the sixteenth century Hearnshaw says1 "The picture which 
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bled the two words down; yet the Latinity of the plu·ase is beyond 
doubt. Ernptor, as the buyer, is genuine enough, and forms of 
cavere, as a verb of caution, are to be found as far. back as 
Plautus.164 The world of antiquity had its hazards, its writers 
were alive to dramatic situations, and as life broke or a story un-
folded there was abundant opportunity to cry to actor or char-
acter to watch his step. In early days, when commerce and 
piracy had not been clearly distinguished, and an irregular tt·ade 
was carried on with a potential enemy, the words may actually 
have been employed.16~ But if they were, they carried only a 
warning against a specific danger; and were probably followed, 
as usage has it, by a clause inhloduced by a ne setting forth the 
threatened danger. They did not embody custom or maxim, rule 
or philosophy. 
Nor could the phrase easily have come into England by any 
reputable intellectual route. It is quite alien to the spirit of the 
civil law. In pastoral and agrarian times, it is true, the pur-
chaser had scant protection; but sales 'vere few and vendible 
wares just as scarce. The buyer was not consciously left to his 
own resources; it was rather that trade was a scant province as 
yet unsubdued to legal conh·ol; 166 as it increased in impor~1.nce 
and in volume, it was made subject to the domain of law and 
order. Quite early the courts decreed that the seller must reveal 
latent defects in the slaves whom he offered in the market-place; 
the principle 'vas extended, first to horses and cattle, and later to 
almost all vendible articles. In a society where the industrial 
sy.stem never outgrew a simple pattern and articles generally 
passed directly from their makers to their users, responsibility 
was thus imposed upon the party to the transaction who had the 
better chance to lmow the product. Where the marketing pro-
these mercantile entries as a whole impress upon the mind of the student 
is that of a semi-socialistic community in which C\'cry craftsman and 
every trader is to some e"-1:ent a public official, working under license, en-
joying monopoly, subject to supervision, 1·egulated by authority in matters 
of quality, quantity, and price of goods, hours of labor, number of ap-
prentices and journeymen, and almost every other particular of !tis occupa-
tion." LEET JURISDICTION IN ENGLAND, supra note 51, at 212. 
164 III THESAURUS LINGUAE LATINAE (1907) 630-644. 
1ss A near parallel is to be found in the oft-quoted line: "Timco Dawwa 
et dona- ferente<P-VmGrL, THE AENEID, Bk. II, 49. In primitive times trade 
began with an e.xchange of gifts. The commercial honesty of the Grcel>S 
was not above reproach and many of theii- neighbors would not have 
trusted the Danians even in a trade. Hence, the words "dona {clcntca" 
may well have a technical significance. 
166 It is of note that the ideas of the later are read back into the uEnges 
of the earlier age. Thus a modern student states that the development 
of the Roman law of warranty began with cm•cat cmpttrr. What he means 
is that, at a time when there was little trade and leEs appreciation of the 
need for protection, the buyer had at law no remedy for a defect in quality. 
MACINTOSH, THE ROMAN LAW OF SALES (1907) 278. 
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cess was complex enough to have a place for middlemen, liability 
still rested with the seller. The remedies for a defect in quality, 
allowing either an annulment of the contract or a reduction of 
the purchase price, constituted a buyer's code.107 The regard 
of the law for the purchaser has led writers to try to crowd its 
complex meaning into the words caveut venditor.108 The Justin-
ian code is replete with references to emptor, and the verb caverc 
is by no means unknown to its titles.160 But neither in sense nor 
in language is the formula cuveut emptor approached. 
Nor does the adage come into repute 170 by way of the law 
merchant. In England as early as the twelfth century traders 
had their own courts. The busy litigants had no time to await 
the trial of a jury 171 or to abide the solemnities of the common 
law.172 They came with dusty feet and had presently to be away 
upon· their business ;173 they demanded justice suited to the occa-
sion; their pleas ought at the latest to be settled before the third 
tide.174 The procedure, through which disputes were settled, 
had its conventions, but was quite simple and direct. A party 
complained; the other party denied tort and force all that should 
be denied; a good inquest was ordered made; the ordeal went 
forward with oath-helpers to the proper number. If the ac-
cused made his law sufficiently, he went quit and the accuser 
was in mercy by reason of his false claim; but if he failed, he 
167 BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW (1921) 488-494. 
1os The expression caveat vendito-r does not belong to the Roman code; 
it is an invention of a modern scholarship, which has contrived an over-
neat distinction between the rules of the civil and the common law. Tho' 
two doctrines are not antitheses. 'l'he buyer, who. knows not the ware, 
must look out lest he purchase a worthless object and be found without a 
legal remedy; the seller, who is in a position to know, must bo on his 
guard, for he will be called upon to make good deficiencies or defects in 
the ware. The use of the term caveat venditor is a conspicuous oxnmplo 
of a moulding of ancient thought into a contemporary pattern. 
169 The forms of "cavere" are frequently used in the sense "to make suro" 
or "to give security." This leads a meticulous schola1· to observe that 
"sibi cavere would carry something of the implication intended by tho 
common law maxim." RADIN, THE LAWFUL PURSUIT OF GAIN (1931) 137, 
n. 10. 
1 7° The discussion in section II of this article indicates that it could not 
have made its English appearance by way of the canon law or ecclesiastical 
discipline. 
111 2 THE LAw MERCHANT,. supra note 148, at Xi. 
112 See section VII of this article. 
11a1 THE LAW MERCHANT, supra note 58, at xxv. As late as 1724 Dofoo 
wrote of Stonebridge Fair; "Here is a court of justice always open •.••• 
Here they (the magistrates of Cambridge) determine matters in a summary 
way, as is practiced in those we call pye-powder courts in other places, 
or as a court of conscience." 1 TOUR THROUGH GREAT BRITAIN (1748) 98. 
174 THE CUSTOMS OF NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE, STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS 
(1913) 107-8. 
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was in defaultP:; The issue was resolved, not by the law of the 
land, but according to the usages and customs of merchants.110 
This vague body of rules is declared to be "the law of Nature, 
called by some 'the Law Merchant,' which is law universal 
throughout the world."177 The principles, so far as they stand 
out in relief, seem to come from over-seas and to be a distant 
off-shoot of the civil law. The standards imposed upon the seller 
are quite exacting.l78 The law states no more than what matters 
of controversy are to be made subject to inquiry; the result de-
pends upon the goodness and the might of the swearing, aided 
by such direction as an experienced court could give to the cere-
monial. Accordingly the subjects of the suits, rather than the 
judgments in the cases, is the matter of importance. In the words 
of the times, "a law is perilous."110 
The 1·ecords are only records, and a scanty part is never the 
desired whole. Yet St. Ives was a large and not unusual fair, 
the items which come from its rolls are near-cases, and the sharp 
practices of which its court took account bear evidence to mer-
cantile usage in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. A num-
ber of inquiries were made into the quality and performance of 
personal services; a smith undertook promptly to shoe a horse 
and dilly-dallied so that its owner lost its sale from the third 
to the ninth hour to his damage a half-mark;180 a carpenter, who 
undertook to build a house, had to pay its O\'irner to his damage 
2 s. for putting alderwood and willow therein contrary to his 
covenant ;lSl and a certain John the son of J olm of Eltisley craved 
and was awarded judgment for 9d against a certain Roger 
Barber, who undertook to cure him of baldness, put his head in 
plaster, and afterwards withdrew from the vill.18z A number 
of entries record instances of ordinary business sharpness; 
Thomas the Canvasser, through his servant, sold canvas by a 
false ell in his booth;183 Reginald Pickard confessed by his O\\'ll 
mouth that he had sold as of the purest gold a ring of brass which 
17:; For typical cases see 1 THE LAw MERCHANT, supra note 58, at 46, 
65, 81. 
11a Ibid. 114; 2 THE LAW IllERCH.ANT supra note 148, at 1W. 
111 A judicial definition of the law merchant in 1473. It is to be found 
in Y. B. Pasc. 13 Edw. IV, f. 9, Pl. 5 (1473) (ed. Brook and Fitzherbert, 
1680), quoted in 2 THE LAW MERCHANT, supra note 148, nt Lx.x.'\..,.·boo .. ·vi. 
11s It is as yet not safe to hazard a conclusion on the relationship of the 
law merchant to the civil law. If an hypothesis which seems plausible 
is true, it limits the field of search for "the good old principle of caveat 
empto-r." 
:1.79 1 THE LAW MERCHANT, supra note 53, at 21. 
18o Ibid. 22. 
;t81 Ibid. 103-104. 
1s2 Ibid. 36-37. 
183 THE MANORIAL CoURTS, supra note 32, at 149. Tlu; record is of the 
fair of St. Ives for the year 1275. 
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he and a one-eyed man had found in the church of a Sunday, 
and had to repay the price and pledge his body for his trespass ;1S4 
the servant of a certain Amelbergar had sold wine by a worth~ 
less pottle false and unsealed and had mixed in a cask Rhenish 
with white wine to defraud the merchants ;18G and William Scot 
and Agnes his wife complained that two cheeses pledged to be 
good and fit to eat were putrid, and the seller was at his law and 
made it insuffi.ciently.186 
Among a mere tantalizing handful of cases four of primary 
importance are to be found ..•.. Hamon of Barton complained 
of William Bishop that he unjustly detained and did not pay him 
for two barrels of salt haddock; the said William answered that 
the condition of the sale was that the fish should be suitable and 
not corrupt; that he found it to be corrupt and fetid; and that 
he refused to accept it, and wholly rejected it and remised it into 
the hands of the said Hamon. The case was apparently settled 
out of court; for afterwards they made concord, and William 
puts himself in mercy 12d.1ST ...•. John of Reading sold to 
Robert of Bedford two bales of licorice and warranted it to him 
as good and pure; the buyer complained that it was not so good 
and pure as the sample, and an inquest was made, whether the 
said licorice ought to be forfeited to the lord king or not accord~ 
ing to merchant law and custom. Although the penalty to be 
assessed for such a breach of covenant is thus definitely set 
down, it is not of record how the case ended.188 ••••• John of 
Honing showed to Roger of Stanton three kemps of good herring, 
and assured him that all the residue was similar; Roger gave 
him a God's penny in confirmation of the bargain ;180 afterwards 
the buyer discovered that the lot was mixed with sticklebacl\s 
and putrid herring; Roger was awarded 40d. damage and John 
was in mercy for 6d.100 ••••• Lawrence Dyer bought of John 
of Grantham, an apothecary, and Bartholomew his servant, a 
bale of plum alum; he claimed that when the bale was emptied 
some days later clay and earth mixed with the alum were found 
contrary to the fo1·m of the covenant; John and Bartholomew 
1&4 Ibid. 139. 
, 18G 1 THE LAW MERCHANT, supra note 58, at 62. 
186 Ibid. 60-61. 
1 8 7 Ibid. 50. 
188 Whether the goods were to be burned, as often they were in the towns, 
or whether the king has a use for them, we are not told. 
1 89 The hand clasp and the God's penny are the formalities which sent 
the bargain. They are the mere vestiges of a ceremonial which was onre 
as decorous as any known to the common law. 2 Bououon CusTOMS, suprct 
note 68, at lx.'CX. It is of note that even in the thirteenth century tho 
court entertained cases growing out of covenant even though the terms 
had not been reduced to writing. 
uo 1 THE LAW MEUCHANT, supra note 58, at 102-103, 
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answered that at the time the bale was delivered the alum vms 
uniform with the sample, in so far as such mineral alum could or 
ought to be uniform; the inquest said that the alum \Vas suffi-
ciently uniform with the sample. So Lawrence took nothing 
by his plaint, but was in mercy 12d for his false claim, and had 
to leave as pledge a bale of alum.101 • • • • • In the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, these cases may be taken to represent 
the law merchant. The buyer relies on the word of the seller, 
no special collocation of words is necessary to constitute war-
ranty, 192 an oral understanding is a binding contract, the mer-
chandise must conform to sample, a confiscation of goods and 
damages to the \\'Tonged are alike penalties for unfair dealing. 
A single one 193 out of fifty reported cases in the central courts 
turns directly upon the issue of the seller's 1·esponsibility for 
the quality of the ware; its lines throw so much light upon the 
law according to mercantile custom as to demand recitution in 
some detail. William of Dunstable had bought from Robert Ie 
Bal' of Winchester five score and three sacks of good merchan-
able wool, fifty-thl·ee sacks for eight marks, and fifty sacks for 
six marks. William caused eight sacks to be opened, four of the 
greater and four of the lesser price. William was well content, 
and Robert faithfully promised that the remaining wool sown up 
in the samples were like the wool opened.13' William, att.'l.ching 
faith to the statements of Robert, took the wool away, and ex-
posed it for sale in parts beyond the sea. There merchants who 
. purchased it upon William's testimony, because he understood 
that it was true to sample, found fifty-tlu·ee sacks to be vile and 
useless and wholly differing from his agreement, \Vhereby 
William and his men stood in peril of death in the foreign parts. 
William made his complaint and assessed a loss in his goods and 
merchandises of a hundred pounds. The Lord King, evidently 
in his vicarious person, was unwilling to leave such great malice 
unpunished, if it should have been perpetrated. So he appointed 
two justices to inquire in the presence of lawful and discreet 
merchants and citizens of Winchester, by the oaths of good and 
lawful men, thl·ough whom the truth of the matter was best to 
be known. Robe1t came to the inquiry under protest, refused 
191 Ibid. 105-6. 
1s2 The word warranty as used in these cases is not an exclusive cere-
monial term; it is used as the equivalent of representation, assurance, or 
pledge. In the cases discussed above the e:q>ressions in the original are 
hoc ex condicione, war1antizavit, promisit, and sub tali plcvina. It seems 
evident that the e.xchange of words at the time of the sale was at best 
of secondary importance. 
193 2 THE LAW 1\!ERCHANT, supra note 148, at 28-30. Pleas of Juries and 
Assizes at Romsey in the County of Southampton (1278). 
194 The words in the original text are "ct rcsiduam lcnzam in sarplcriis 
consutam similenL lane aperte esse fideliter pi'omisit." 
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to answer, and departed in contempt of the court. The jurors 
found the facts to be as set forth, said upon their oaths that the 
sale upon the assumption that the entire lot was alike and of 
the same clip as the sample was according to the law merchant, 
and awarded to William his price against Robert and in addi-
tion his losses as taxed by good and lawful citizens and mer-
chants. This case, and the collection to which it belongs, at-
tests a law merchant in which "credit, not distrust," is the basis 
of commercial dealings.195 
Accordingly, one must look elsewhere to discover the ancient 
adage. The apt maxim is not to be found within holy church 100 
or the liberty of commune; it is unknown to the administrative 
courts of gild and town and fair; it is not to be fashioned out 
of such stuff as the civil law and the customs that were amongst 
merchants.197 The quest leads from the highways to the byways 
of sociallife.198 In early days the church had put its curse upon 
trade; it was evil, all evil, and the manner of its conduct did not 
matter.199 One who trafficked was beyond its Christian fellowship. 
As it became respectable a petty and disorderly commerce grew 
up beyond the reach of the many arms of mediaeval control. 
Away from the marts of organized trade were to be found the 
wayfaring palmer with his relics and trinkets, the peripatetic 
peddlar with. gew-gaws and ornaments, strangers here today 
195 This is a characterization of the law merchant by one of its abl(Jst 
students. SORUTl'ON, ELEMENTS OF MERCANTILE LAW (1891) 23. 
196 The idea is to be found in the elementary formula for Christian mar· 
riage; the parties accept each other for better or for worse. In England 
from a time unknown until quite recently there has been a limited in· 
dulgence in the sale of wives. Even though the law has not accorded 
recognition, the bargains have usually stood. Whether the price was a mug 
of beer or a lusty sum in gold, it was understood that the buyer took his 
chance upon latent defects in the chattle. Kenny, Wife-Selling in Englctncl 
(1929) 45 L. Q. REV. 494.' 
197 The author of the article CAVEAT EMPI'OR in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OP SO· 
CIAL SciENCES '280 (1930) declares, "As maxim, custom, and 1·ule ccwoat 
· emptm· is a product of the Middle Ages." At best the statement has au-
thority,· rather than evidence, to support it. 
198 A quotation from Sandys, Instructions Towchinge the Bill for F1·eo 
Trade, in 2 CUNNININGHAM, supra note 142, at 287, is in point: "All free 
subjects" are entitled "to the free exercise of their industrie in those trades 
whereto they applie themselves and whereby they are to live. Merchan-
dise being the chiefe and richest of all other, and of greater extent and 
importance than all the rest, it is against the naturall right and liberty 
of the Subjects of England to restrain it into the hands of some fewe." 
The specific complaint is, of course, against the grant of royal monopolies. 
199 If trade was sinful, there was no right~ous way of engagiJ1g in it. A 
modern parallel is bootlegging. If the sale of alcoholic beve1·ages is illegal, 
the law is not presumed to be mindful of the ways in which the business 
is conducted. A bill introduced in the legislature of a Southern state mak-
ing it a misdemeanor for a vendor to sell short pints and quarts presents 
the issue graphically. 
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and there tomorrow, wayfaring men of no place and without 
the law.:wo In such wares one had to trade at his peril; there 
was no authentic test for holy water and bones of the saints, 
for Venetian glass and spices of Araby. Nor could a standard 
have been used; before the latent became the obvious fault, the 
itinerant was far on his unknown 'vay. There, too, was to be 
discovered the seller-by-trade, no good merchant of the realm, 
but a rogue an..'dous to be rid of stolen chattels, or horses from 
far away, or valuables from a ship which after all might not 
have been wrecked. There, too, was the horse-trader, the er~ 
ratic properties of whose merchandise could not be reduced to 
a standard model; he was not e:l\.1Jected to cry the uncertain de-
fects of his steed or nag from the house-tops. Among such per~ 
sons without rank or of mean estate a redress of ''Tongs was 
practically not to be had. It took time and the bitterness of e."{-
perience to subdue the idea into compact language; but here it 
came to be understood that one's unconsidered bargain was his 
own tough luck. 
How the trick of phrase was turned, and CCL11Cat cmptm· came 
into being we do not know. The wisdom seems to be the after-
thought of the good man who has bargained, perhaps in a horse 
trade, once too often; the manner suggests the la·wyer regret-
fully stating that the grievance seems to be ·without redress. It 
has happened often enough that tinkers and butchers and brew-
ers have won the favor of kings and have then walked unabashed 
among the nobly born. Surely a ca.vcat cmpt{)r may emerge from 
the folk-thought of the despised trades and stand without shame 
before judges as an ancient maxim of the common law. 
VII 
At the end of the sixteenth century the common law was not 
yet the common law.201 Its procedures still held the rigidity of 
the o_rdeal out of which it was contrived; it shared the domain 
of justice with courts of custom, the liberties of the towns, and 
special tribunals; it had hardly as yet brought within its juris-
diction the affairs of the common man.::Q:: Yet it has usually 
zoo AYDELOTTE, ELIZABE'l'HAN ROGUES AND V AGADONDS (1913) j CUTTS, 
SCENES AND CHARACTERS OF THE 1\liDDLE AGES (1885) j JUSSERA?\'D, WAY• 
FARING LIFE IN THE 1\liDDLE AGES (1884) j JESSOP, TDE COMING OF THE 
FRIARS (1889). The well-Imown incident of l\lose nnd the spectncles, com-
ing from a later period, is in point. GOLDSMITH, THE VICAR OF WARE· 
FIELD. 
201 The term common law is used in a number of different senses. Here 
it is employed as a name for the law administered in the Jdng's courts in 
contradistinction to the law of courts of custom, the lnw of the boroughs, 
and the law merchant. 
202 Goebel, King's Law and Local Custmn in ScvC1ztcmth CC1th!ry New 
England (1931) 31 CoL. L. RE\'. 416. 
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been administered as if it were exclusive,203 and as if its current 
interpretation had always prevailed.204 It has, accordingly, 
rested its decrees upon reason, natural justice, and enlightened 
public policy,2°:; and has claimed for even its novelties the author~ 
ity of established precedent. 
The expression caveat emptor, in its upward climb, appears in 
print for the first time well along in the sixteenth century. The 
context is a legal discussion, and the reference, appropriately 
enough, is to horse trading. Fitzherbert wrote, "if he be tame 
and have ben rydden upon, then caveat emptor."200 In another 
passage the same writer cautions the buyer to make sure of the 
goodness of his bargain in horse-flesh while yet there is time,201 
if the horse be sold without a warranty, it is "at the other's 
peril, for his eyes and his taste ought to be his judges" in that 
case. An ordinance of Lancaster, relating to the purchase of 
malt, ignored the distinction between obvious and latent defects 
and restated an old proverb, "let their eye be their chapman."2('8 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century 200 the expression 
appears to be quite well lmown.21° Coke never hestitated to 
sum up a lucid discussion in a Latin line which seems to evade 
search, but on occasion a saying was at hand as neat as an in~ 
vention of his own. In his treatises on the law he twice set down 
the maxim he helped to make famous. The almost unnoticed use 
occurs in the discussion of a statute of Elizabeth, 211 contrived 
2oa "Equity is a roguish thing; for law we have a measure, know whnt 
to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chnncellor, 
and as that is higher or nanower so is equity." Selden, quoted in Tuds· 
bery, Law Me1·chant and the Common Law, (1918) 34 L. Q. RElV. 392, 400. 
2 04 Powicke, Per ludicum Parium Vel Per Legem Termc, MAGNA CUAit'rA 
COMMEMORATION ESSAYS (1917.) 121. 
2o:; Norway Plains Co. v. Boston and Maine R.R., supra note 9, at 286. 
206 FITZHEitBERT, BOKE OF HUSBANDitiE (1534) § 118. 
207 FITZHERBERT, NAT. BREV. (1534) 94 c. The reference is to an uction 
upon the case at common law. 
2118 2 BOROUGH CUSTOMS supra note 68, at 183. The date is 1562. "It 
was proverbial in France, 'qui n'ouvre pa~ ycux doit ozttwir let bourse/' 
Ibid. lxxxiii. 
2oo Compare the line: "To things of sale a seller's praise belongs." 
SHAKESPEARE, LovE's LABORS LosT, Act IV, Scene 3, 1. 240. 
210 Th~ word caviat, as a noun, was coming into use in the sixteenth 
century. It is, as a lay word, a-take-care, and as a legal term an injunction 
or prohibition. 2 A NEW DICTIONAitY ON HISTOitiCAL PmNCHPLES (Oxford, 
1893) at 203 lists from various sixteenth century writers. "A caveat to 
be ware of to moche confidence" (1557) ; "It pleased the goodness of God 
by giving the law to put in a caveat •••. for the tranquilitie of manldnde.'' 
(1577) ; "Fumbleth at the matter with a folis caveat" (1579); "Such 
caveats as I to the friendly can utter" (1583). A seventeenth centut·y 
writer scribbled, "A caveat to you how you live" ( 1646). 
211 Statute of 31 ELIZABETH, 12, concerning Sellers of Horses in Fah·s 
and Markets (1589), in VI STATUTES AT LARGE (1763), 419. The statuto 
provided that the sale be made in a place that is overt, that a erodible 
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to lessen the temptation of horse-stealing by providing for sale 
in open markeU12 The much quoted passage comes from a dis-
cussion of landlord and tenant and concerns warranty of l:md.:ll.3 
It makes reference to the further discussion of real property ;:!u 
even as a parenthesis it can hardly have reference to the title 
or the quality of wares of trade. It runs, "Note that by the ch~il 
law every man is bound to warrant the thing he selleth or con-
veyeth, albeit there be no e:l\."}Ji·ess warranty, either in deed or in 
law; but the common law bindeth him not, for caveat cmptm·." 
But even Coke cannot make an ancient maxim canonical; it is, 
accordingly, interesting to observe the unconventional way in 
which it broke into the law reports. A celebrated cause :!l~ con-
cerned with the ravishment of a wealthy ward came along early 
in the seventeenth century. It had to do with a feme col•crt, 
the value of a marriage, and other matters of the law of estates. 
In an inquiry into the just use of law in odium spolitoris, the 
learned judge had occasion to consider, and to put aside as ir-
relevant, a rule of law urged upon him by counsel. It reads, 
"Caveat emptor, qui ig1wrari 1wn debzdt qzwd alicnum jus 
emit,216 and it comes with the authority of Second Westminster. 
The ancient statute has been accurately quoted except in hvo 
particulars.217 The first is that e·mit is followed by the qualify-
ing clause "usque ad etatem 'lVa?Tanti sui de 'lvarrantia habenda." 
The second is that the word which precedes cmpf()r is not caveat 
but e~;pecteU18 But the changes, due to imperfect memory or 
person avouch the seller, that the price be entered in the toller's book, that 
a note in writing be given to the purchaser, that the true owner might 
redeem within sb:: months for so much money as the purchaser paid, and 
that all accessories to a felonious sale be deprived and put from all bene-
fit of clergy. The act, with amendments, is still in force. 
212 CoKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES (1642) '114. 
21s Co. LITT. (1633) 102a; L. 2. C. 7 S. 145. 
214 Ibid. L. 3. C. 13. 
21s Moore v. Hussey, Hobart 93, 80 Eng. Rep. 243 (1601). 
216 Ibid. 99; 80 Eng. Rep., at 249. 
21• The statute of Westminster II, c. 40 (1295), in STATUTES AT LAnGE, 
(edited by Owen Ruffhead 1763) 106. The citation given in Hobart, c. 1-1 
is incorrect. The substitution of 14 for 40 seems to indicate that the con-
fusion was of ear rather than of eye. The conte~d; seems to indicate tl1nt 
it was the attorney rather than the judge who made the substitution in 
verbs. 
21s It may perhaps be of interest to record the "'llole chapter and to 
note the neatness with which the lines were lifted from their context and 
the profit to meaning by the substitution of a single word: Cum quis 
alienat jv.s v-:~oris sue concordatum est quod dccctcro sccta mulicris vel cjus 
hercdis non diffemtur post obitwn 'l'i1'i per mincn·cm ctatcm ltc;·cdis qui-
CAVEAT 
wa'N'aitizare debet sed Es:j3eetet QUI IGNORARI NoN DEBUlT QuoD ALIENU!Il 
Jus EMIT usque ad etatem· warranti sui de 1t'arrantia sua lzabcncla. The 
translation, given ibid, runs: Where any doth aliene the Right of his 
Wife. it is agreed, That from henceforth the suit of the Woman, or her 
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inexact reading, are very cleverly contrived. The omission of a 
condition and the conversion of a special injunction to wait into o 
a general warning are quite purposive. The words form a uniy 
versa! maxim for future use as legal convenience demands.210 
Even today the sonorous line "caveat emptor qui ignotari non 
debuit quod alienum jus emit" survives in ponderous worlts of 
reference.220 Its plentitude is convincing, and it bears no ling-
ering traces of the alien context of feudal law from which it 
has been deftly removed. 
The cause of the unfortunate ward has been forgotten; only 
a sentence lives on. But a very different case, decided at about 
the same time, was destined to give the prestige of authority 
to the rising doctrine of caveat emptor. A suit for the recovery 
of the value of a worthless bezoar stone, which had been bought 
in all good faith, became in the fulness of time the foundation 
of the common law rule of warranty. The disappointed pur-
chaser brought an action on the case against the seller for de-
ceit. The King's Bench gave a judgment in his favor; but in the 
Exchequer, on appeal, all the barons save Anderson were of op-
inion that a warranty by the goldsmith and an allegation that 
he knew the jewel was not what it was affirmed to be were 
necessary to a cause of action. The judges added that the wary 
ranty must be made at the time of the sale. The dissenter re-
garded the act of selling the precious stone for what it was not 
as enough to establish deceit.221 Thereupon a new writ was sued 
out; it was, with quaint propriety, set down that the seller, 
knowing it was not good, but a false and fictitious stone, as-
serted it to be good and sold it to the->buyer who was ignorant 
of the goodness thereof. The attorneys for the purchaser urged 
that an action for deceit lay if the vendor affirmed more than 
was true of his wares; the opposing counsel plead the necessity 
for express warranty and invoked ca.veat emptm·. As to whether 
the source of the deceit lay in the seller's conscious misrepresen-
Heir, after the Death of her Husband, shall not be delayed by tho Nonage 
of the Heir that ought to warrantise, but let the Purchaser tarry, which 
ought not to have been ignorant that he bought the Right of anothl'r, 
until the age of his Warrantor to have his Warranty. 
2J.9 It is of note that the mistake in citation has been corrected neithN' 
in the reprint by Chilton in 1724 nor in the English reports. The gonornl 
reference works usually cite "Hobart 99" without correcting tho citation 
or pointing out the inaccuracy of the quotation from Westminster II. Tho 
only exception among a goodly number at hand is BURRELL, A NEW LAW 
DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY (1850) where citation and text are proporly 
given. 
220 The glib sentence, abstracted from its context, is easily lifted fl'om 
book to book. A modern book of reference, which is not without its ttscs1 
sets it down in the form above in black type across a page. 11 C. J. 44. Thoro 
it is cited from 1 U.C. Jur. OS 193!. 
221 Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (1603). 
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tation or in the credulity of the buyer, the court divided. It 
was, however, admitted by all that if scicns le defendant were 
omitted, the plaintiff could not recover.222 Although a casual 
reference in a later report 223 records the buyer's victory, the 
result is left in doubt. 
It is not easy to e:ll..'iract the law of that day from the uncer-
tain record of the case. Accident contributed to meaning ;22' 
the first action was reported and was given a place in the life 
hi.:;tory of the doctrine of warranty; the second action, which 
esc;aped the reports and was not published until long afterwards, 
contributed not even a corrective touch to the e:ll..-planation. As 
a result a cause whose concern ''ms the validity of a declaration 
was treated as if it disposed of the cause. The contemporary 
documents reveal no causes enough like it in kind to take away 
the uncertainty of its meaning. The cases from which support 
is drawn concern such unlike things as the sale of a tun of cor-
rupt wine,2z:; the playing of the game of Five or Nine with false 
dice, 226 the very profitable use of a counterfeit letter, 22: the dis-
position of tithes by a vicar who was far from being estab-
Iished/28 and the reception of presents by a damsel who refused to 
go to the altar.229 The concept warranty presents its difficulties; 
it is, as used by common-law judges, a word from the technical 
vocabulary of real property, applied to the rather immobile 
chattels 220 of an agrarian society, and likely to bring to the 
wares of trade the rigidities of the land law. From the con-
temporary reports one gets a picture of a learned bench, far 
more at home with solemn covenants, the leisurely resort to 
parchment, and the decorous use of seals than with the bustle 
of activity and the informal understandings which attend an 
expanding commerce. The te:ll..'i presents its difficulties; the only 
record which had a chance to make judicial history was not 
printed for a half century; in the stirring days of the Stuarts 
222 Ibid.; Note (1S94) 9 HARVARD L. REV. 282. 
223 The statement of counsel in Southern v. How, Cro. Jac. 4GS (1618). 
224 Even an incorrect date has made its contribution to the interpreta-
tion. An authority set the year down as 1625, and this ltas been copied 
without a check by a number of writers. The difference of twenty-t\vo 
years is rather appreciable since 1606 is the date usually set down as the 
real beginning of the administration of the law merchant in the Idng's 
courts. 
22n 1 Roll Ab. (1688) 90, pl. 1, 2. See also Ibid. 90, pl. 3. 
226 Harris v. Bowden, Cro. Eliz. 90, 78 Eng. Rep. 348 (1587). 
221 Tracy v. Veal, Cro. Jac. 223, 79 Eng. Rep. 194 (1610). 
= Roswel v. !l!aughan, Cro. Jac. 196, 79 Eng. Rep. 171 (1GOS). 
229 This action was brought, not for deceit, but in assumpsit. King v. 
Robinson, Cro. Eliz. 79; 78 Eng. Rep. 339 (1587). 
220 A horse may be defined, in terms of legal theory, as the detacltable 
agrarian chattel through which the common-law concept of warranty, in-
digenous to real property, was carried over to tlte wares of commerce. 
;:: 
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opinion was changing fast; and the reporters were not disposed 
to refrain when a touch here and there would give to their 
readers the true law. The printed report sets it down 231 that 
in the action on the case warranty 232 and scienter 233 are neces-
sary allegations; it is parlous to find in it more than a statement 
of standards to which an action in deceit, sounding in tort, must 
conform. 
It is, however, the case recreated, rather than the case decided, 
which takes its place in history. The partial record of the 
cause of the bezoar stone stood in the annals almost in solitary 
detachment; it invited conversion into an ancient land-mark of 
the law by the technique of the interpreter's'trade. The author-
itarian common sense which was still unquestioned, the doingg 
of courts of leet and borough, the usual resort of the trader to 
the law merchant, the lack of evidence in the contemporary rolls 
of more than an occasional concern by His Majesty's Justiciars 
with commercial litigation were overlooked. The decision of 
King's Bench, the dissent in the Exchequer Chamber, and the 
divided opinion when the case came on anew passed into ob-
livion. The formalities of procedure were stripped away, and 
there was to be discovered the substantive rule under which the 
buyer was to recover for an inferior ware. He had a cause of 
action if he had exacted an express warranty at the time of the 
231 For discussions of the case, see McClain, Implied Warranties in Sales 
(1893) 7 HARV. L. REV. 213; 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
(1926) 68-69. 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906} 378·380; 
LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES (1930) 209·211, 
2a2 A dictum set down in Chandelor v. Lopus, supra note 221, at 4, is 
"the warranty ought to be made at the same time as the sale.'' The line is 
repeated in Roswel v. Vaughan, supra note 228, at 196, with the statement 
that "the affirmation was made upon the ninth of June, and tho sale was 
16th June after.'' There was an insistence that the proper form of doclar· 
ation was "warrantizando vendidit" not "warrantizavit et vendidit." Sec 
also the later case Mew v. Russell, 2 Shower 284 (1682}. 
233 Although a Wl'it in assumpsit was known, its use was limited. For 
a grievance of this kind an action in tort for deceit seems to have boon 
a common law remedy too rarely employed, or reported, to be called usual. 
The whole matter bristles with engaging questions and with difficulties. A 
discussion of the emergence of the action for deceit out of trespass and 
of the relation of actions for deceit and in assumpsit is beyond tho limits 
of this paper. The reader is referred to AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL IllS· 
TORY (1913) 136ff, and to STREET, op. cit. supra note 231, at 173ff. Tho use 
of assumpsit in regard to the non-performance of undertakings by persons 
belonging to "the common callings" is discussed by AMES, ibid., and by 
Atterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings (1927) 75 U. o~· 
PA. L. REV. 411. The published material is scanty and interpretation is 
highly treacherous going. It seems to me that in early modern times tho 
common callings were far from being the narrowly restricted category 
usually set down. We sh;ill perhaps not be able to know the obligations 
attached to them or to discover the legal remedies usually employed in 
~ase of non-fulfillment without research into the records of the local courts. 
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sale from a seller who knew his representations to be false. An 
affirmation, no matter how many holy saints were invoked, fell 
short of a warranty; latent defects, however impervious to or-
dinary vision, were the purchaser's own lookout. 'When in time 
writs were accommodated more sharply to specific complaints, 
the "and" of the holding gave way to an "or", and the buyer had 
the alternative of a suit in assumpsit on e}.'}>ress warranty or in 
deceit by proving a scienter. The exactions of a ceremonial were 
set down as an injunction to the buyer to look to himself for 
protection.234, 
The raw materials of a judicial doctrine of caveat emptor were 
scant enough. An excerpt or two from Fitzherbert or whoever 
wrote his books, a neat distinction between the civil and the 
common law pried from its context in Coke, a persuasive but 
doctored line of Latin lifted from a venerable document, the pre-
scribed tests for the validity of a declaration in deceit, the du-
bious support of a handful of none too relevant cases,-and that 
was all. But the words were there, ready; to bear the ideas of 
a later age; and interpretation, the great creator, was to prove 
equal to tlie occasion. 
VIII 
The anxious suitor, with or without his hundred pounds, left 
the court, and we hear of him no more. ·we read little, too, of 
the issue which Iris worthless jewel raised; for the reports from 
decade to decade are almost barren of resort to the courts to 
protect the integrity of mercantile sales.23G It is not until near 
the end of the eighteenth century that cases in point come along 
in sufficient volume to give meaning to general rules of law. But 
the late eighteenth century reveals another world than that of 
the Stuarts. 
The first half of the seventeenth century ushered in a crisis 
which had long been in the making. A course of unintended and 
234 "There can be no such thing as a warranty witltout an e~qm~ss agree-
ment." 1 STREET, ()p. cit. supra note 231, at 379. "The view then pre-
vailing" was "to the effect that an affirmation cannot amount to a war-
ranty." Ibid. 381, n. 2. "The only importance of the decision today is, in 
any event, not the point decided but the language of the court which is 
enlightening as to the view taken at that time in regard to wltat constituted 
an e:l..-press warranty."-Wn.LISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS 
(1909) 247, n. 79. 
23~ Wn.LISTON, op. cit. supra note 234, at 247-248. The cases of Cro~s v. 
Gardner, 1 Shower 68 (1689), and 1\!edina v. Stoughton, 1 Ld. Raym, G93 
(1700), are concerned with sales by sellers who did not poEses:s title. It 
is significant that, despite a plea in the first of a lack of scienter and in 
the second of an initial purchase in good faith, judgments were gi\"en 
against the sellers. It is of note in passing that quality of the ware is a 
matter far more alien to the established law than title to the chattel. 
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almost unperceived events brought confusion to the authoritarian 
system of control. In England the break with Rome had been 
no more than a formal separation; but a church, free from the 
Papacy, was not to withstand reformation; and protestantism, 
knowing not where to call a halt, multiplied sects and made the 
orthodoxy which all sought hard to discover. The Stuart kings, 
professing to rule by divine right, weakened the monarchy by 
trying to make it omnipotent; the state came to be a rival of a 
church which had fallen under its control. The conversion of an 
adventitious trade into established industries created markets, 
multiplied wares, and established commerce in regular and ex~ 
panding channels. The goods were becoming too many, their 
uses too numerous, and their qualities too diverse to fit the 
stereotyped requirements which came intermittently from West~ 
minster. The rise of traders into a powerful estate brought to 
common affairs a merchantile viewpoint quite at variance with 
a national ideal of ascetic origin. As the bourgeois came to be 
powerful they could n,ot remain quietly tolerant of a studied su~ 
pervision of their activities. They were not to be "over~ thwarted 
by preachers and others that cannot skill of their dealings,"230 
or by interfering busybodies dispatched from Whitehal1.231 The 
men of business, great and small, found in the tolerant this~ 
worldliness of Puritanism 238 tenets much to their liking; in the 
Civil wars they furnished no small part of the support of the 
Parliamentary cause. The Christian courts of conscience, with 
their ecclesiastical discipline, were not proof against mercantile 
ways and social disorder and began their decline. The break-
down of the central government disorganized the system of 
market control which had come to be dependent upon national 
authority for power and supervision.230 Trade had to take 
the hazards of troublous times; but it enjoyed for the 
first time a rather large exemption from the solicitude of 
authority.240 In time a parliamentary system came to replace 
230 DISCOURSE UPON USURY, supra note 27, at 64. 
231 TAWNEY, op. cit. supra note 161, at 237. 
2as1 Weber, Die protestantische Ethik 1md der Geist des I(apitctlwmus, 
GESAMMELTE AUFSATZE SUR RELIIGIONSSOZIOL'OGIE (1920), assigns to Purl· 
tanism a role of importance in the creation of the political conditions and 
the ethical values out of which capitalism emerged. Baxter refers to 11the 
merchants and middle sort of men that were Protestants." Quoted by 
Tawney, op. cit. supra note 161, at 203. 
239 HASBACH, DIE ENGLISH CHEN LAND ARBETIER (1894) shows the in• 
cidence of the untoward disorder of the struggle between King and Parlia-
ment upon the integrity of the national scheme of regulation. 
24o 2 CuNNINGHAM ,supra note 142, at 201-6, argues that with the de· 
cline of ecclesiastical discipline a greater burden was thrown upon the 
courts in which the common law was administered. His argument is that 
since there was no longer an agency powerful enough to enforce moral 
obligations, the only recourse was to plead legal obligations in courts of 
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the monarchical model; but an individualism, which was rather 
of fact than of idea and still too much in embryo to be clearly 
perceived, had been born. 
As the eighteenth century wore on, an empirical was passing 
into a rational individualism. The pamphleteers had led the 
way,241 the mercantile virtues were discovered, and the thinkers 
were busy in elaborating the crude notion of the goodness of 
every man's minding his own business into a great philosophical 
system.242 Instead of each man to his station, as God h..'lth ap-
pointed, each was to find for himself his own place in society. 
The appeal was to Nature and to Nature's God; the government 
became the villain and the individual the hero in the piece; each 
rational being could best pursue for himself his own true hap-
piness. In penning a declaration of independence for the in-
dividual Adam Smith voiced the advanced thought of his day ;:!43 
his argument, in justification, that each person, in aiming only 
at his own advantage, "is led by an invisible hand to promote 
an end which is no part of his intention"~H won a growing ap-
proval. The age of natural law, of revolt against authority, of 
laissez-faire was emerging. 
Nor had the legal system withstood the impact of shock. In a 
competitive struggle the common law courts had acquired a larger 
share of the business of justice. The local courts of custom 
lost their semi-independence, and the litigious business of traders 
law. At the time, howev~r, there were still legal agencies, other than 
common-law courts, and there is much evidence that the formalities of the 
King's justice did not immediately and easily accommodate themselves to 
the new need. 
241 A typical pamphlet is l\!ANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES (172-1). 
Its thesis is indicated by its sub-title, "or Private Vices, Publick Bene.fits.'' 
The particular vice, whose praise the muse is im·oked to sing is "The root 
of Evil, Avarise," It has, if truth be told, done quite a Jot of good in the 
world: 
Thus Vice nurs'd Ingenuity, 
Which joyn'd with Time and Industry, 
Had carry'd Life's Conveniences, 
Its real Pleasures, Comforts, Ease, 
To such a Height, the very Poor 
Liv'd better than the Rich before, 
And nothing could be added more.'' - Ibid. 11. 
A similar tribute to industry, to trade, and its freedom, is to be found in 
FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALMANAC. An interesting discUfsion of the com-
mon-sense of mercantilism is to be found in the chapter on "Tile Holy 
Eco?W?ny'' in SO!IIBART, THE QUili.'TESSENCE OF CAPITALISM. 
242 An account of the beginnings of philosophical individualism in many 
domains of the mind is to be found in STEPHEN, HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
THOUGHT IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (latest edition 1927). 
243 A happy accident has put the publication of Adam Smith's AN IN-
QUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND !JAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, in the 
year of the American Declaration of Independence, 1776. 
~44 Ibid. bk. iv, ch. 2. 
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came before the ordinary tribunals. It is usual to date the 
administration of the law merchant by the King's courts from 
Coke and its incorporation into the common law from Mans-
field.245 But neither. in England nor in law does growth occur 
with such precision. Even before Coke became Chief Justice 
a trickle of commercial litigation flowed into the King's courts, 
and the court of piepowder was still to be found after Mansfield 
had left the bench.246 But if the central courts secured the busi-
ness and collected the revenue, it was upon terms acceptable to 
men of business. The mercantile customs as well as the facts were 
referred to juries of merchants, and there was little law to be 
declared or to be set down in reports. It was usual not to apply 
the law merchant unless one of the parties was a genuine trader; 
but the courts showed at least a disposition to disregard this re-
quirement 247 and to allow subject-matter to be the determinant. 
248 Although he was not the first, Mansfield made a usage o£ con-
sorting with merchants out of com·t and declaring their customs 
from the bench.249 Accordingly the closing decades of the 
eighteenth century are marked by the strain which attends the 
assimilation of mercantile custom 250 into the body of the com-
mon law. 
The picture which the reports present is of uncertainty and 
halting innovation. The usages of the law merchant were not 
of a kind with the solemnities of common law procedure; judges 
whose training had been in the ceremonial of the more reputable 
discipline moved clumsily from tort to contract; they were prone 
to meet novel cases with the older concepts. A special form o£ 
assumpsit, of which the disappointed buyer might avail himself, 
had quietly come into being. It may have developed from an 
older writ/5-1 or it may have been an invention to handle causes 
formerly tried under the law merchant ;252 its use, as an alterna-
' 
245 THE ELEMENTS OF MERCANTILE LAW, supra note 195, at 6-21. 
24G THE LAW MERCHANT, I, xix, records an instance of a session of a court 
of pie powder as late as 1898. 
247 It has been my privilege to consult an unpublished manuscript by 
Charles Aikin of the University of California entitled "Tho Law Merchant 
and the Law Making Process." On pp. 152-3, Mr. Aikin discusses tho 
extension of the law merchant to the transactions of parties who wero not 
merchants. 
21s "It being objected that in this case there was no averment of the de· 
fendant's being a merchant, it was answered by the Court that tho drnw· 
ing the bill was a sufficient merchandizing and negotiating to this pur· 
pose." Hodges v. Steward, 1 Salk. 125 {1691). 
249 2 CAMWEJLL, LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES {1873), 
250 For evidence of develo;pment in a very interesting legal domain sci.' 
Vance, The Early History of Insurance Lctw, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANULO· 
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1909) 98. 
251 WILLISTON, snpra note 234, at 247-9. 
2s2 The form of "assumpsit" probably comes from tho comn~on law. But 
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tive to an action in deceit, was imperfectly understood, and it 
was not until after the turn of the century that the separate ac-
tions were given their distinctive provinces.~3 Thus caveat 
emptor, whatever it was, was subject to the exceptions that the 
seller must make good a warranty and was liable for fraud. But 
such words are among the most catholic of concepts, and an 
excursion into the annals of the law is necessary to make it clear 
whether it was easy for the purchaser to prove his case or 
whether the vendor was allowed a generous indulgence in lang-
uage. 
An authoritative statement is not easy to discover. Cm.'cat 
ernptor appears frequently in the records, voiced more often by 
counsel than set down by court. In the treatises of the period, 
which bear evidence of the great transition through which the 
law was passing, the status of the good old rule for the en-
couragement of trade is far from established. The Great Com-
mentator, whose opus came just in time to help make the law, 
mentions formalities of ancient writs, and then recites almost 
the exact language of the civil law; he uses the words "war-
rants" and "represents" as synonyms; excuses the seller "against 
defects that are plainly and obviously the object of one's senses"; 
holds that "an artifice" to disguise the goods is "equivalent to 
an e}...llress warranty," and writes down liability where the short-
coming cannot be discovered by "sight" and is a matter of "sldll" 
or "collat~ral proof."2M The words are very nearly those of 
Thomas Aquinas; the standards may well be those which his 
friend Mansfield, whose weakness for the Roman code was well 
known, was bringing into the law.2~:; A quarter of a century later 
it is not unlikely that the action is a borrowing from the law merchant. A 
suit in covenant, supported by a "tally'' or an oral agreement, was enter-
tained in courts of pie powder as early as the thirteenth century. Quite a 
bit of testimony supports an inference of importation into the common Jaw, 
but I have been able to discover no direct evidence. 
:!:;3 In Williamson v. Allison, 2 East 446; 102 Eng. Rep. 439 (1802), Lord 
Ellenborough declared, "the more modern practice of declaring in assumpsit 
in these cases has not prevailed generally above forty years.'' But, in 
Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 19, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (1'178) 1\tr. Justice Buller 
said, "this mode has been in use ever since I have known anything of 
practice, and my brother Ashhurst remembers it ntuch longer.'' 
254 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAZ...'D (Am. ed. 
17'12) 165-66. The te~d; remains unaltered in the last edition revised by 
the author. 
255 There is, of course, no necessary antithesis between the freedom of 
trade from governmental interference and the insistence upon fair deal-
ings in trade by the courts. \Vhere trade has cut its channels the mer-
cantile class is likely to insist upon both. In the hurly-burly which marks 
the passage of an agrarian into an industrial society a legislative laissc:-
faire is likely to be accompanied by a judicial t'arcat cmpto;·. The in-
tellectual association of the maintenance of free contract with tlle reduc-
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another Vinerian Professor remembers caveat empto1· as a "very 
unconscientious maxim," which seems "~o have prevailed"; his 
allusion is probably to the inflexibility of the common law ac~ 
tions. He refers to it as, happily, "now exploded,"200 and sets 
down the seller's "skill in the way of his business" and his ac~ 
quaintance with "the value of his wares" as accepted presump~ 
tions.257 In spite of the "difficulty in applying general rules to 
particular cases" he asserts that "a man is not supposed in the 
contract for sale, to part with his money, without expecting an 
adequate compensation," and holds that "a fair price implies a 
warranty."258 On the contrary a writer on Equity, in a discus~ 
sion of "mistake," which touches alike upon lands and chattels 
and wares, sets it down for the common law, that the general 
· rule is caveat emptor and that the buyer has a legal remedy only 
because of "express wan-anty," deceit "to disguise defects," and 
"provisions unwholesome at the time of delivery."2;;u 
The appeal from treatise to case, from principle to holding, 
reveals the same uncertain place of caveat emptor in the private 
law. The cases of record are a mere fragment of a large volume 
of litigation which is beyond access. The reports are hard go~ 
ing; the verbalisms of the common law are used to aescribe the 
most unlike things; they show scant regard for their ancient 
usage, and blur the line between the litigious affairs of a landed 
gentry and those of an estate of business; the incidental matter, 
the record of judicial hear-say, the casual references to undated 
and unrecorded cases of long age give to them something of the 
quality of the year-books. In their pages 200 warranty, probably 
due to the taint of commercial litigation, has lost something of 
its post-feudal stiffness; deceit is less of an ordeal for one who 
undertakes its proof.. . . A seller who undertook and faithfully 
tion of contractual protection to a minimum belongs rather to judges thnn 
to men of business. 
256 2 WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF TllEl LAWS OI•' ENGLAND 
(1793) 415-6. 
257 3 ibid. 199. 
i5s 2 ibid. 415. 
2591 FoNBLANQUE, A TREATISE OF EQUITY (1793) 109-10, 373-4. 
200 In addition to the cases mentioned here, a number of others should be 
consulted, not so much because they are in point us becnuse of their re• 
peated citation in later judicial discussions of caveat emptl)r, In Spring· 
well v. Allen, Aleyn 91, 82 Eng. Rep. 931 (1648), the buyer could not 
recover, because he could not prove that the seller knew the horse wns not 
his own. In Paget v. Wilkinson, 102 Eng. Rep. 440, note (n) by the editor, 
it is reported, "unless the vendor" of lottery tickets "knew them to bo tho 
property of another or warranted them," neither an action on the cn~~o nol' 
assumpsit would lie. In Bree v. Holbech 2 Doug. 654, 99 Eng. Rep. 415 
(1781), it was held that the assignee could not "recover buck the mortgngl' 
money," although he did not discover for six years that the mortgngo wns 
u forgery. 
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promised that a. mare was sound, contriving and fraudulently 
intending to injure the buyer, was held to account because of the 
latent defect of windgalls.m ..... The purchaser of two pictures 
which turned out to have been painted by the "Tong artist was 
left without redress; it was a near-antique and the name of the 
painter set dmvn in the catalogue represented no more than the 
opinion of the dealer.262 ••••• The buyer of twenty-four bottles 
of claret which proved to be unfit for export was not compelled 
to allege scienter against the seller and recovered upon a war-
ranty.263 ... A price had been paid for a bar of metal, calcul-
ated upon the basis of an assay made by an eh-pert. The judges 
professed a high regard for the abstract rule of caveat empt<rr, 
but found that neither party had exercised his own judgment, 
and allowed the sale to be rescinded.2" 1 ••• An article, bought 
and delivered, revealed so much of a taint that it did not ans\ver 
the character of prime singed bacon; the trial judge held that 
the contract amounted to a warranty, rejected a custom of the 
trade that a defect must be reported before a certain time, and 
upheld a judgment for the buyer.20:; •••• An advertisement of-
fered for sale a copper-fastened vessel which was to be taken 
with all faults, \vithout allowance for any defects whatsoever; 
the purchaser, who had full opportunity to examine, later dis-
covered it to be only partially copper-fastened; but, inasmuch 
as the meaning of the advertisement was that the seller \Vould 
not be responsible for any faults which a copper-fastened ves-
sel might have, the buyer was allowed his recovery.2ca 
Each of these cases presents its own testimony as to the state 
of the law in a critical period. But the famous hops case, which 
came with the beginning of the new century, is so illuminating 
as to deserve its separate paragraph. A cargo consisting of 
five pockets of hops was sold by sample. The sample was good, 
but one after another the pockets began to rot and proved worth-
less. It was discovered that the fault lay, not with the seller 
2s1 In assumpsit. Stuart v. Wilkins, supra note 253. 
2s2 The action was for debt. J endwine v. Slade, 1 Esp. 572, (1797). 
2G3 An action on the case in tort for a breach of warranty. Williamson 
v. Allison, supm note 253. To the same effect see Denison v. Ralphson, 
1 Vent. 365, 86 Eng. Rep. 235 (1682). In Dowding v. Mortimer 2 East 
449, 102 Eng. Rep. 440 (1798), note (a) 3 by the editor, the declaration 
states "that the plaintiff .••. bargained with the defendant to buy of him a 
certain musket as and for a sound and perfect musket" and the defendant 
sold it ''knowing the said musket to be unsound, broken, and imperfect.'' 
It is stated, Williamson v. Allison, supra note 253, at 449-50, that Lord 
Kenyon was of opinion "that the scienter was necessary to be proved.'' 
2G4ASS'Ump$it. Cox v. Prentice. 3 l\1. & S. 344; 105 Eng. Rep. 641 (1815). 
2s;:; Action upon a sale note. Yates v. Pym, 6 Taunt 446, 128 Eng. Rep. 
1107 (1816). ' 
2ss Case for the breach of a warranty. Shepherd v. Kain 5 B. & A. 240, 
106 Eng. Rep. 1180 (1821). 
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who was ignorant of the latent defect, but with the grower who 
had watered the grain to enhance his price. An attempt of the 
buyer to collect from the perpetrator of the fraud failed; a suit 
was then brought against the,seller, and the issue became which 
of the two innocent parties should bear the loss. The attorneys 
for the plaintiff plead an implied warranty, insisted that great 
inconvenience would attend the reduction of every future con-
tingency to formal understanding, and relied upon the common 
faith and the usages of trade, which is bottomed in confidence. 
The barristers who represented the defence plead a lack of 
express warranty and an absence of deceit, and claimed the rule 
of caveat emptor. The bench insisted that the buyer had had 
his opportunity to inspect; and that if he had doubted, he might 
have insisted upon a formal warranty or have refused to pur-
chase. The judge who at the trial had decided for the plain-
tiff recanted; upon further consideration he was persuaded that 
his rule could not apply to other cases, namely horses. Ellen-
borough, whose great passion was not for Mansfield's contribu-
tions to law, refrained from participation because he had been 
concerned in the cause, but could not restrain an expression of 
his entire concurrence in the judgment.207 Here is to be found 
customs of merchants and law of the land, concepts of the com-
mon law and the usages of trade, ancient rules and echoes from 
Blackstone and Wooddeson. Through the eleven pages of record 
all the winds of doctrine blow. If the sum of it all seems incon-
clusive, it bristles with potential meaning. It is impossible for 
the reader of the several opinions to escape the conclusion that 
the innocence of the dealer, who was a party distinct from the 
fraudulent grower, was the dominant consideration with the 
bench. Yet the hops case came to be a mighty support to ju-
dicial caveat empto1· second in importance only to the judgment 
in the cause of the bezoar stone. 
But, however dubious its status, individualism was to have its 
triumph; for even legal rules are not proof against the common-
sense of the judges who must employ them. The courts of King's 
Bench and of Common Pleas never quite lost sight of the ac-
tualities of commerce; the Court of the Exchequer proved much 
the more willing to leave business to its own devices ...• A ship, 
at the moment stranded upon a rock in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, 
was disposed of by sale in London. There was no proof that 
the seller knew of the mishap, and the question was whether a 
267 In assumpsit. Parkinson v. Lee 2 East 314, 102 Eng. Rep. 38!> (1802). 
An interesting side-light upon the scarcity of published cases is tho rolianco 
of counsel for plaintiff upon Stuart v. Wilkins, supra note 253, and tho 
reference to it by one of the judges as "the case in Douglas.'' It is of 
note that whereas that case decided that the buyer might sue in assumpsit 
upon a warranty, it is referred to here as holding that an "express wal'-
ranty" is essential to the success of the action. 
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ship, although on shore, with the possibility though not the 
probability of being got off, was still a ship. The court admitted 
that the vessel was not a ship under the law of insurance and 
probably was not a ship for so secular a purpose as sailing. But, 
as a subject of contract, it had not ceased to answer to the 
description and still bore the character of a ship, even though 
damaged, unseaworthy, and incapable of being beneficially em-
ployed.268 .... A brewer ordered a patent smoke-consuming fur-
nace to be installed in his establishment. Its performanc(" failed 
to bear testimony to the appropriateness of the name; Lut the 
court, as yet unschooled in functional jurisprudence, held that 
the seller had performed his part of the contract by delivering 
a defined and well-known machine.2G9 ••••• A cargo of cotton had 
been purchased by sample, and nearly one-third of the bales 
turned out to be falsely packed; the outside layers, from which 
alone the sample could be drawn, were good, but the interiors 
were bad. The court noted that the seller was a dealer, dis-
covered that the representation '\vas not false to the party making 
it, refused to take notice of the customs of the trade, and held 
that the rule of caveat empt.Qr applied.270 ••••• The refusal of 
protection was e:l\.-tended even to the sale of provisions ;m yet a 
strange twist of circumstance and hvo causes were necessary to 
turn the trick. A farmer purchased the carcas of a pig from a 
butcher, but having business to do left it in the vendor's custody. 
A second farmer came along, took a fancy to the same piece of 
meat, awaited the return of its owner, and purchased it of him. 
Although eyes had been deceived and the flesh was corrupt, one 
farmer could not recover from another who had not been de..'l.ling 
as a common trader.272 But a rule which applied to a farmer 
and a private sale might, with the help of common sense and a 
little ingenious straining, be made to govern a butcher and a 
public market; so a later court held that a vendor, who had no 
reason to suspect the unfitness of Iris meat, could not be held for 
an implied war1·anty.m ..... Cases such as these can, with little 
loss of color, be recited at length.2'"' 
But, if a more compelling authority is demanded, it is to be 
had from the highest comt of the realm. In a famous cause,::r.:; 
which bears a hventieth century date, the House of Lords trans-
2ss Barr v. Gibson, 3 III. & W. 389 (1838). 
26il Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 l'tl. & W. 399 (1838). 
2ro Ormrod v. Huth, 14 W. & W. 651 (1845). 
271Roswell v. Vaughn, Sl!pra note 238. 
212 Burnby v. Bollett, 16 III. & W. 644 (1847). 
273 Emmeston v. Mathews, 7 H. & N. 585 (1862). 
2u It is of note that in these later cases, American writers, especially Stocy 
and Kent are quoted and American cases cited by counsel for defendants. 
The seller's law in the making receives cont~ibutions from across the '\Yater. 
m Heilbut, Symons and Co. v. Buckleton, [1913] A.C. 30. 
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lated the trust reposed by an investor in an underwriter into 
credulity and denied recovery. The Lord Chancellor took his 
stand upon general principles, invoked time"honored decisions, 
and lamented the tendency disclosed even in the Law Reports, 
to slip from one legal conceptibn to another which is quite dif-
ferent.276 He uses the terms assumpsit and case, but pleads for 
a -return to the clear"cut distinction 277 between two legal actions 
~et down with such precision in the judgment in the case of the 
bezoa .~ stone.278 
Asr·&e law is, so has it always been. The buyer who at the 
time of the sale has failed to exact positive assurances against 
future contingencies deserves to take the consequences of his 
slothfulness. 
IX 
We must, however, turn from England to America to witness the 
real triumph of caveat emptor. In the new republic the tradi-
tion of authority did not linger long after the war for independ-
ence, the intellectual individualism was reinforced by the spirit 
of the frontier, an emerging industrial system was not to be 
shackled by formal control, and the courts were quite loath to 
take up the shock of business friction. The common law, with 
rule and precept, had been accepted; the lines of precedents were 
useful to judges who had little first"hand acquaintance with the 
society whence they came; their scanty text was to be read in 
the light of reason and of sense. 
The early decisions in New York present the norm of doctrine 
zrG In Medina v. Stoughton, swpra note 235, heard beforo Holt, C. J., 
it was held that, "where one having the possession of any personal chattel 
sells it, the bare affirming it to be his amounts to a warranty." In Pasley 
v. Freeman, 3 B & E 51, 57, (1789), Holt, C. J., is quoted, "that an afllrm-
ation at the time of a sale is a warranty, provided it appear on evidonco 
to have been so intended." Lord Haldane, s~Lpl'a, note 276, at 38, sots it 
down, "that an affirmation can only be a warranty provided it appear on 
evidence to have been so intended." Holt sat in the case, but the ol'iglnal 
statement is not imputed to him by the reporter; the original and tho 
quoted statements have reference to different matters. But it is moro 
significant that Holt was attempting to extend protection by enlarging a 
concept, and Haldane invokes his authority to refuse protection by narrow-
ing it. The topic, "The Utility of the Word 'Only' in Law" invites a most 
engaging essay, which might, among other things, contain at least a para· 
graph upon "the tendency ..• to slip from one legal conception to another 
which is quite different." 
211 The passage, ibid. 38, is an excellent example of tho sincere and un· 
critical way in which current judicial meanings are rend back into ancient 
terms. 
zrs "That good old doctrine for the encouragement of trade, lmown, as 
caveat emptor, has received no such support for many years.'' Williston, 
Representation and Warranty in Sales (1913) 27 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13. 
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which came to prevail. They differ from the contemporary run 
of judicial utterance only in their more studied. worlrmanship. 
The leading case is a bare two years later than the judgment of 
King's Bench in the matter of the hops; its concern is a sale, 
without a formal warranty, of peachum wood for braziletto. 
The plaintiff, though a servant, and the defendant, who was the 
consignee, alike had opportunity to examine the cargo, and 
neither discovered it to be 'vorthless. The court wasted few 
words on the facts, recited appropriately the right decisions, 
found neither express warranty nor conscious deceit, and dis-
missed the suit with a caveat enz,ptor . ••.• :.!::o A cargo of kelp, 
consigned by merchants abroad to their factors in this country, 
was sold at auction as barilla. The products differ materially 
in alkali content and in their usefulness in the manufacture of 
soap; they can be distinguished only by scientific analysis. The 
court insisted that the description of the article as barilla was 
an opinion and not a warranty, and that the buyer exercised 
his judgment on it, and bought it at his own risk .•... ::so 
A manufacturer of starch purchased of a commission merchant 
some three hundred barrels of :flour for which he paid a fair 
price; the :flour, milled from grown wheat, turned out to be 
useless for his purposes or even for conversion into ordinary 
bread. The court held that the :flour was merchantable since it 
was fit for some purposes, insisted that the purchaser had failed 
to protect himself, and laid it down that his judgment was his 
only warrantor ...... 281 There were, even in the early nine-
teenth century, decisions to the contrary; ::,:: but tltis typical 
sequence indicates the judicial disposition not to encourage mul-
tiplicity of actions. 
279 Seixas and Seixas v. Woods, 2 Caine R. 48 (N.Y. 1804). Kent was a 
member of the court and wrote a concurring opinion. It is of interest 
that in many of the early cases, as here, there was a dhosent. 
2so Sweet v. Cilgage, 20 Johns. 190 (N.Y. 1822). 
2s1 Wright v. Hart, 18 Wend 449 (N.Y. 1837). The state of opinion can 
best be described as dh>ided. The vote of the court for the correction of 
errors was 15 to 9. For the decision of the supreme court, which reversed 
the trial court, and was sustained by the court of enors, see Hat·t v. 
Wright, 17 Wend. 267 (N. Y. 1837). 
2s2 In a case involving the sale of paint by sample, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania found that "a sample, or description in a sale note, ad\·ertis~ 
ment, bill of parcels, or invoice, is equivalent to an e.x'Pr~s warranty that 
the goods are what they are described" and allowed damages. Borrekins 
v. Bevan, 3 Raule 23 (Pa. 1831). The case is interesting because Mr. 
Chief Justice Gibson dissented in a plea for clear-cut categories and hard-
headed law. The dissenting >>iew proved to be the more dominant; in fact, 
as late as 1909, Williston WI'ote that "Pennsylvania alone of the United 
States seems to have retained" the older notions about e.li.'Press warranty. 
THE LAw GoVERNING THE SALE OF Gooos, supm note 234, nt 2G3-1. See 
also Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass. 197 (1813). 
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The tomes of American law are full of like judgments; but 
far more impo~tant than holdings are the prevailing ideas which 
narrowed or broadened concepts and drove arguments to their 
conclusions. The case system had not yet come to reduce the 
self-revelations of judicial opinion to mere dicta. The men of 
the age had a firm faith in first principles, and law was not to 
escape the creed of fundamentalism. The general values which 
make rules do their bidding were set down in leading cases and 
in solemn treatises, and were universally regarded as important. 
To Thompson the doctrine of caveat emptor was best calculated 
to excite that caution and attention which all prudent men ought 
to observe in making their contracts." 283 Cowan regarded the 
rigid definitions of warranty and of fraud as necessary to 
"avoid at least a pilgrimage of litigation, if not a total subver-
sion of the common law rule." 2s4 Tracy feared "extending each 
case a little beyond the rule of the case immediately preceding 
it, instead of measuring it by the original standard principle." 2 ~0 
Richardson saw as a threat the endowment of the courts with 
"a species of eminent domain to make or break contracts." 2~0 
Gibson found a departure from the strict rule to be contrary to 
the usages of trade; "a chapman praises his own commodity with 
no other view than to enhance its value in the eyes of his cus-
tomers, who in turn deprecates it with a view to cheapen it," 
and yet for all the verbal to-do it never entered the head of either 
that he acted "on anyone's judgment but his own." 2~7 'rhey 
were one and all opposed to the broad discretions and the nice 
discriminations which seemed to attend the loose and litigious 
principle of the civil law. 
The views of judges in state courts won the approval of un-
questioned legal authority. Kent, in his commentaries, shares 
Cicero's regret that the principles of the higher ethics are "too 
austere in their texture and too sublime in speculation for actual 
use," admits that human laws "are not so perfect as the dictates 
of conscience" and that "the sphere of morality is more enlarged 
than the limits of civil jurisdiction," and defends the ccwcat 
emptor which "very reasonably requires the purchaser to at-
tend, when he makes his contract, to the quality of the article he 
buys." 288 Story finds ~hat in spite of all that may be said 
against it the old rule "is now too firmly established to be open 
283 Seixas and Seixas v. Woods, supra note 279, at 54. 
284 Hart v. 'Vright, supra note 281, at 275. 
2su Wright v. Hart, supra note 281, at 461. 
28G Harrington v. The Commissioners of Road of Newberry District, 2 
McCord 400 (S. C. 1823). 
287 Borrekins v. Bevan, supra note 282, at 46-7. 
288 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (4th ed. 1840) 4901 4911 
478. 
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to legal controversy." 280 1\:Ir. Justice Davis, speaking for the 
United States Supreme Court,200 declared caveat emptm· to be of 
"such universal acceptance" that, with a single exception, "the 
courts of all the States in the union, where the common law pre-
vails, sanction it." The proper office of usages of tJ.·ade, as they 
exist in various localities, is to help to make clear "the meaning 
and the intentions of the parties;" but they are never, directly or 
by implication, to be allowed to replace the natural terms of the 
contract which impose upon the buyer "the risk of purchase" and 
relieve the seller "from liability for latent defects." If caveat 
empto-r were to yield to mercantile custom, "the whole doctrine" 
would be "frittered away." 291 The ancient maxim ~02 met the 
needs alike of trade and of justice. 
A doctrine so acceptable was destined to linger long in the 
pages of the law reports. It finds pithy expression in a text 
from Gibson, whom many persons of discernment placed above 
even the great Marshall himself; "the naked averment of a fact 
is neither a warranty itself nor evidence of it." ::33 The po\ver 
of the creed of judiciallaissez-faire was in evidence in the early 
years of the present century. The statement that a mare which 
had lapsed from the good estate of health was all right,:::H that 
swine which rather incontinently succumbed to disease were 
sound, 29li and that a hay stacker, which was certainly not the 
world's best, would do its work more economically than any other 
machine 296 were more than representations, but somewhat less 
than warranties . • • . . . A letter "to confirm" the sale of "No. 3 
and No.2 wheat," was not a legal assurance that the grain was 
of the specified grades when the buyer had had his opportunity to 
inspect ...•. . 291 A sample, which was good, served well enough 
to effect a sale of eggs, but did not relieve the buyer from paying 
a full price for a mouldy lot .....• 208 An "express understand-
ing" that a radio would give satisfactory results allowed the court 
to invoke judicial notice and find an excuse in the current imper-
289 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1st cd. 1836) 221. 
290 Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U. S. 383, 388 (1870). 
291 Ibid. 394. 
292 An English writer of the age, not without his influence, focuses 
upon the ancient adage eleven closely-packed pages of law. Bnoor.t, A 
SELECTION OF LEGAL nlA..XI!IIS CLASSIFIED AND ILLUSTRATED (ed. of 1845). 
The motto on the title page, a quotation from Sir James 1\lackintosh, is 
significant: "Ma}>.ims are the condensed Good Sense of Nations." 
293 McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55 (Pa. 1839). 
294Walker v. Kirk, 72 Pa. Super. Ct. 534, 536 (1919). 
29~ Van Horn v. Stautz, 297 Ill. 530, 540, 131 N. E. 153 (1921). 
296 Carver-Shadbolt Co. v. Loch, 87 Wash., 453, 151 Pac. 787 (19l::i). 
291 St. Anthony and Dakota Elevator Co. v. P1·inceton nolling :Mill Co. 
104 Minn. 401, 116 N. W. 935 (1908). 
298 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Narzisenfeld, :1 Fed. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 2d, 
1924). 
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feet state of electric technology ...... 290 The assurance that 
certain vapour stoves possessed rather extraordinary properties 
and would sell like hot cakes fell well within the elastic language 
of truth as salesmen spoke it ...... 300 The display of advertis-
ing 301 is rather a general invitation to trade than a proffer of 
specific merchandises.302 Courts have not yet ceased to mnka 
a meticulous assay of the verbal coinage which passed at 
the time of the sale; nor has the notion departed that assurances 
by seller that all is well with their wares are a mere Simian 
accompaniment to the high theme of trade. Even today at least 
a lingering "justice" is to be done without driving the seller 
"into the toils of an imaginary contract." ar•a 
The source of the vitality in late judicial uttrance is not far 
to seek. It lies not in the decadent rules of a seller's law as 
applied by literal-minded judges but in the compelling power of 
an individualistic common sense which has not yet spent itself. 
It comes from the law behind the law in the classic lines of tha 
early cases. There are to be met Fitzherbert and Coke and the 
persuasive Latin, archaic lines from far-off causes and holdings 
fresh from abroad, the omnipresent pockets of fermented hops 
and the ghost of the inescapable bezoar stone. Even Blackstone, 
by judicious quotation, is made to do conscript service in the 
worthy cause: It is an imposing intellectual structure, all of it 
deft and quite sincere and very purposive, an example of the art. 
of giving text and precepts detached from their setting current 
employment. Behind it all, selecting, trimming, adjusting, and 
directing the stately march of the argument is reason as it was 
currently understood. The judges knew that one man was as 
good as another; they believed in the economic virtues ; they 
made their decisions in private actions a declaration of public 
policy. Their common sense gave to a mass of verbal fragments 
from unknown climates of opinion the pulsing life of American 
democracy. 
X 
The coming of caveat emptor into the public law demands no 
lengthy account. The occasional attempts of the legislature to 
keep unworthy wares out of the buyer's reach have had the 
200 Cool v Fighter, 239 Mich. •12, 214 N. W. 162 (1927). 
wo Detroit Vapor Stove Co. v. J. C. Webster Lumber Co., 61 Utah 603, 
215 Pac. 995 (1923). 
ao1 For the strictures placed upon advertising see Note (1922) 17 A. L, 
R. 672, 707; Note (1925) 39 A. L. R. 992, 999. 
3oz An adept in the art of advertising declares that ropy is nddrt>ssed 
to "to whom it may concern" and is signed "caveat emptor.'' On Bcinu 
Fired 56 NEW REPUBLIC 228 (1931). 
3(13 Mr. C. J. Gibson, in McFarland v. Newman, supra note 293, at GO. 
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attention they deserve. The silence of the law-making body is 
the truest comment upon the dominion of the accepted adage. 
In England a supervision of the market, which was more than 
pretense and less th?-n reality, was maintained until well past 
the Restoration. But a shattered authority never made a com-
plete recovery from the shock of civil war, and its formulas 
were much too elementary to contain the turbulant life of an 
expanding commerce. As an ideal it could not survive the pro-
tracted crisis which attended the coming of industrialism. The 
laws contrived for the protection of the consumer were repealed 
or forgotten; the machinery of la'\Y enforcement fell into disuse. 
The matter of the quality of the '\Yare, passed out of the province 
of government into the economic order. In the market, 3~• as the 
schoolmen of the day were wont to argue, sellers were balanced 
against buyers, each '\Yas in his mercenary efforts checli:ed by 
the competition of others of his kind, and quality even as price 
was neatly accommodated to individual want.3Q~ The regulation 
of weights and measures and a lax supervision of provisions 
alone remained to tell of a great scheme of control which was 
gone. The freedom to express its will over affairs that needed 
not its solicitude was still left to the legislature. 
In America fact conspired with law to make even more endur-
ing the absence of legislation. The dubious prestige of author-
itative control could not withstand the impact of a continent of 
resources inviting the e::-...'}>loitation of a machine technique. The 
common sense of individualism was captured and imprisoned 
in words engrossed upon parchment; the Constitution of the 
United States in due time came to recognize a province of private 
right into which a government with limited powers could not 
intrude. As the threat of legislation appeared, liberty and prop-
erty passed uhder the protection of the supreme law of the land. 
A freedom of contract, which comprehended the seller's right 
to determine the vendible qualities of goods, was to be abridged 
only when an insistent need could summon the police pO'\Yer to 
its support. Save in so exceptional an instance, an open market 
invited whosoever '\Yould to come and sell. In behalf of the right 
freely to bargain the judiciary might be invoked to declare a 
legislative act a nullity. 
As long as laissez-faire '''as common sense, the judicial pro-
tection of the seller's liberties was a mere abstraction. As law-
;;o4 A contemporary eJ..."}lOSition of the neatness and dispatch with which 
all market problems are solved if left to the natural laws of competition 
is to be found in a once well-known discussion of "the relation of political 
economy to natural theology," WHETI;LY, INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON POLI-
TICAL EcoNOMY, (2d ed. 1832}. The lectures arc created out of just such 
ideological stuff as went into the judicial opinions of the day. 
w;; For an appraisal of the operation of "the economic law'' see the 
article on Competitfun in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, 141 (1931). 
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making bodies began to busy themselves in the consumer's be-
half it became a reality. For decades the power of the state even 
over impure foods, if not lost, was inert from disuse; for de-
cades its negligent supervision took in little more than millt 
and meat. The domain of regulation has been stubbornly ,ex-
tended; the power of the legislature has been questioned, or the 
reasonableness of the method has been disputed, or lawful stat-
utes have been made to serve alien ends. . . . The taxes im-
posed upon the sale of oleomargerine, found valid as health 
measures, have protected the market of rival dairy prod-
ucts ...... 306 An act decreeing that loaves of bread come within 
two ounces of their professed weight either denies to bakers a 
tolerance made necessary by their imperfect art or imposes 
upon them the expense of wrapping their bread in wax-
paper ...... 307 A statute outlawing the use of shoddy in the 
manufacture of bed coverings recalls ancient prohibitions 
against mixing old with new; yet, in these later days when t•aw 
materials are artificially sterilized, it has been found to be a 
superfluous health measure ...... 308 An act of a state designed 
to protect aliens within its borders in the purchase of ocean 
steamship tickets is invalid, for the integrity of the domain of 
the federal government must be preserved ...... 300 A munici· 
pality cannot protect the harrassed housewife against canvas-
sers who take orders for concerns without the state .•.•• ,sto A 
constitutional arsenal filled with an assortment of dialectical 
tools is an excellent help; the discussion usually runs in terms 
of reasonableness and jurisdictions and powers and limits of dis-
cretion; the substantive question, to regulate or not to regula to, 
often enough remains discreetly in the background. 
The same disposition not to cramp the style of trade is else· 
where in evidence. The concept of fraud, at criminal law, has 
ofttimes been narrowly interpreted when commercial dealings 
have been passed in review. The courts have accorded to swind-
lers their legal deserts; but they have on occasion sharply dis-
tinguished "mere lies" from the grosser manifestation of un-
truth.311 As a buyer the national government takes its own pre-
306 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 8 Sup. Ct. 992 (1888); Plumley 
v.l\lassachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 15 Sup. Ct. 154; McCrary v. United States, 
195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769 (1904). See also Collins v. New Hampshire, 
171 U.S. 30, 18 Sup. Ct. 768 (1898), and Schollenberger v. Pennsylvanin, 
171 U. S. 1, 18 Sup. Ct. 757 (1898). 
w; Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504, 44 Sup. Ct. 412 (1924). 
aos Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U. S. 402, 46 Sup. Ct. 320 (1926), 
aoo Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34, 47 Sup. Ct. 267 (1927), 
a1o Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U. S. 124, 30 Sup. Ct. 649 {1910); Crenshaw 
v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389, 33 Sup. Ct. '294 (1913); Real Silk ,Mills v. 
Portland, 268 U. S. 325, 45 Sup. Ct. 525 {1925); and cases cited therein. 
• s11 RADIN, op. cit. s-upra note 169, at 47-49, 131; Commonwealth v. War· 
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cautions; it subjects rival products, not to the test of the senses, 
but to exhaustive scientific analysis, measurement, and e"--peri-
mentation; yet it refuses to furnish to its own citizens the re-
sults of its researches. Its devotion to ccwcat cmpto;· has led it 
to help sellers to discover a pragmatic basis for the vendible 
qualities of their wares. A leaflet from the Department of Com-
merce informs the trade that in Belgium the chauffeur, through 
whose agency most automobile tires are bought, "is not so much 
interested in the quality as he is in the rebate which he is to 
receive from the dealers," and that accordingly, he is "not par-
ticularly attracted by tires whose long-v.·earing qualities mal\:e 
purchases too infrequent." 312 Another tract, emanating from 
the same source, conveys to whom it may concern the informa-
tion that the Chinese buy patent medicines "according to trade-
mark" rather than by "their healing qualities," and that in India 
"the stronger the claims and apparent action of the product the 
more it is appreciated."313 
It is a far cry from authoritative control to modern mercan-
tilism. The English borough sought to guard the gates of the 
market and deny entrance to unworthy goods. The up-to-date 
state undertakes to instruct producers how to subordinate good-
ness in their wares to vendibility. Yet caveat onptor claims to 
descend from an ancient lineag~. 
XI 
All of this, after the manner of our day, is a hypothesis. The 
account has been written, so far as exposition allows, in the 
language of the documents. But words from ancient records 
are treacherous things; their meaning is inseparable from the 
little known worlds of facts and ideas which brought them forth. 
The men who set dmvn the meager lines served their own pur-
poses; they can be hailed into no scribbler's court for further 
questioning. The curious inquirer must constantly be on his 
guard lest he illumine their phrases with a reason and a sense 
which is not theirs. The materials were not made-to-order; :Ju 
significant items may elude search, a number of serious gaps 
cannot be filled, unaccessible manuscripts may some day per-
ren, 6 1\Iass. 72 (1809) ; State v. Sampson, 10 N. C. 620 (182:5); Common-
wealth v. Springer, 8 Pa. C. C. R. 115 (1889). 
312ltJarket for Rubber Goods in Belgium, U. S. DEPARTl\tE!'\T OF Co:.t-
!llERCE, TRADE INFORMATION BULLETIN, No. 65 (1922). 
313 !Jlarkets for Ame1·ican Phannacculical Pnparation.'J. U. S. DEPo\nT-
!IIENT oF CoMMERCE. TRADE lNFOR:I!ATION BULLETIN, No. 149 (1923). 
314 The materials which are not set down here are quite abundant. Yet 
they are ·in general of a kind with the evidence presented. I have tried 
not to let any item escape this record which tells against the conclusion I 
have reached. 
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versely break into print. Yet, an aggregation of facts that hangs 
well together merits its record as a probable explanation. After 
all, interpretation is a venture. 
The expression caveat emptor savors too much of the copy-
book and the almanac to have a clear-cut history. A bit of wis-
dom may live long before it takes possession of a convenient 
verbal symbol ; a collocation of words may be home to a succession 
of ideas. The notion that one had better look lest he rue his 
bargain is probably as old as trade ; the phrase caveat empwr 
is a Latin proverb of late Anglican vintage. It hovered uncer-
tainly on the fringes of respectability, but found no reputable 
place within the great authoritarian scheme by which Christian 
society was ordered. As a rule of law in the King's courts it 
wa's no more than shorthand for the want of an easy jurisdic-
tion or the lack of a convenient writ. The common sense of in-
dividualism won for it judicial acceptance, fitted it out with legal 
trappings, and made it a vehicle of public policy. Its triumph 
was more complete in America than in England, in public than 
in private law. Not until the nineteenth century, did judges 
discover that caveat emptor sharpened wits, taught self-reliance, 
made a man-an economic man-out of the buyer, and served 
well its two masters, business and justice. 
The victory was never quite .complete. The meaning of the 
maxim is to be discovered along the unstable and changing line 
which separates the buyer's protection from the seller's immun-
ity. The law accepts proverbial wisdom on its own terms; an 
adage must make its truce with concept and rule and stand 
against the persistent attack of stubborn facts. The judges who 
made the maxim live were creating for the seller a domain of 
vocal freedom; in endowing judicial non-interference with 
antiquity and authority, they did protest too much. They were 
greatly bothered by judgments which did not fit in; in their 
homilies they lament the departures of other courts from time-
honored precepts, and decry the insidious influence of the civil 
law. Their statements owe much to the contemporary existence 
of a contrary rule; the innovation, at which they are leveled, 
may well have been the older and more reputable law. 
Yet, for all the protest, the frittering way, the going astray, 
the insidious pervasion went on apace. The concept of deceit 
was enlarged; an express warranty was in time joined by the 
subversive term implied warranty; the idea of negligence was 
borrowed, and increased measurably the seller's responsibility. 
The words which passed at the time of the sale made a place 
beside themselves for the usages of trade, and even the bugaboo 
of privity of contract had to fall back before the impersonal 
mechanisms of a market society. In time major premises gave 
way, rules were remade to take account of exceptions, and uni-
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form sales acts established standards of legal rectitude for buy-
ers and sellers. A lagging public la\'t began to reassert a claim 
to an abandoned province of control. The account of the de-
cline of caveat empt.()r is full of the dramatic stuff of concepts 
captured by newer reason, rules remade by exceptions, and pre-
cedents recreated in the likeness of current holdings. But that 
story/15 which for some chapters runs parallel, lies beyond the 
limits of this inquiry. 
But, lest there be mistake about it, caveat cmptm· is not yet 
a historical doctrine. The course of legal events has merely re-
duced its rule to a constitutional monarchy. The precept is still 
to be discovered behind enlarged rules of deceit, warranty, and 
negligence, behind established tests, inspection, and trade prac-
tice. The protection accorded the buyer is as yet neither broad 
nor certain. At best only a minimum of quality is assured and 
that in matters which do not invite great difference in opinion. 
Business is business and law is law, but neither insures quality 
to the book, long life to the garment, style to the furniture, or 
durability to the automobile. The market, to guard against an 
interruption in the stream of purchase, establishes its own stand-
ards, but the rational customs of modern merchants are bot-
tomed in utility only so far as vendibility decrees. In many 
industries improvement is directed rather to points of the prod-
uct which may be talked up than to features in need of mend-
ing. At best a seller's words have a limited currency in court; 
salesman are not limited to a simple recital of bare fact, and 
advertising has not ceased to be a creative art. The ordinary 
man, who ventures forth to market with only his senses as his 
chapmen finds hims~lf face to face with the great collectivism of 
salesmanship, with its seried ranks to batter down resistance and 
render impotent his will. As an individual he cannot be sure 
the article he was induced to purchase satisfies a need he really 
feels. The doctrine which is now established freed from the 
crudities of its lowly origin, maintains a position worthy of its 
ancient lineage. But, in plain speech and at law, a refined caveat 
e1nptm· still means that purchase is a game of chance. 
31;; A penetrating account of this change, with an abundance of illustra-
tive material from the reports, is to be found in LLEWELLYN, CASES AND 
J:llATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES, supra. note 231, at 20·1-420. 
